

# Persistence of Farmer-Herder Conflicts in Tanzania

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**Abstract-** The study was conducted to examine the factors that have contributed to the causes and persistence of farmer-herder conflicts in Tanzania. The work is anchored on the fact that there have been numerous efforts by the government to bring to an end the conflicts between farmers and herders but these conflicts have been escalating and are becoming economically and socially unbearable. Respondents for the study included farmers, herders, and district level officials in Kilombero, Kiteto, Rufiji and Kilosa districts. Focus Group Discussions were conducted to collect information on conflict resolution mechanisms and the persistence of the conflicts in their areas. Key informants interviews and discussions involving individual farmers, herders, village leaders and district government leaders were also conducted. Major factors for the persistence of conflicts between farmers and herders were found to include policy deficiencies and contradictions, insecurity of land tenure, inadequacy of capacity of the local institutions, corrupt practices, poor coordination in resettling the migrants, inadequate capacity in village land use planning, and the heavy handed approaches used to resolve the conflicts. The study concludes that the root cause of the conflicts is the lack of security of land tenure to smallholder farmers and herders who hold and use unsurveyed land that is liable for alienation through acquisition and encroachment. Unless the government reviews its land policy to ensure security of land tenure land grabbing and corrupt practices will escalate and lead to further conflicts.

**Index Terms-** Farmer-herder conflicts, Land tenure, Land policy, Tanzania.

## I. INTRODUCTION

Land in Tanzania as throughout much of Africa is a primary asset for survival and a major source of income and livelihoods for the rural population. Land is not only a source for livelihoods and valuable economic asset but also carries spiritual values with it. Therefore, access to landed resources is not merely a matter of productive use of the ecological environment; it involves power and symbolic relations (Meur et. al., 2006). In this way, land resources have continued to have major historical, cultural and spiritual significance (Odgaard, 2006, the Encyclopedia of Earth, 2008). Due to increased population pressure and the diversification of rural land use patterns in Tanzania (i.e. expansion of settled and ranching farming, national parks, towns and settlements) access to pasture and water for livestock has diminished thus prompting pastoralists to migrate to the central, eastern and southern parts of the country (Odgaard, 2005, Mattee and Shem, 2006). The squeezing out of pastoralists from their traditional grazing lands has spurred the tension and conflicts with farming communities. In view of the

growing magnitude of the problem and the gravity of the consequences associated with these conflicts the government has put in numerous efforts to address the problem. However, the conflicts persist and in some cases they have escalated. Therefore, this paper seeks to examine the factors contributing to the persistence and escalation of farmer-herder conflicts in Tanzania.

## II. METHODS

The findings discussed in this paper are based on a series of surveys in four districts of Kilombero, Kiteto, Rufiji and Kilosa conducted between 2012 and 2014. These are among the many districts in the country where farmer – herder conflicts have been reported to be on the increase in recent years. Pastoral and agro-pastoral ethnic groups in this study include the Maasai, Barabaig, Sukuma, and Kwavi and to a lesser extent the Gogo. Focus Group Discussions (three in each district) were conducted to collect information on conflict resolution mechanisms and the persistence of the conflicts in their areas. The size of the groups ranged from 8 to 12 people including both farmers and herders at village level. At the district level only one group was conducted for the district officials. Key informants interviews and discussions involving individual farmers (12), herders (10), village leaders (4) and district government leaders (8) were conducted and these provided valuable insights into the findings.

## III. AN OVERVIEW OF FARMER-HERDER CONFLICTS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

A wide body of scientific literature on Sub-Saharan Africa has consistently acknowledged the historical co-existence of farmers and herders in symbiotic relationships (Bassett, 1988). Seddon and Sumberg (1997) also acknowledge the long historical record of fluctuating conflict, competition and co-operation between settled farmers and pastoral or transhumant herders in the continent. Such relationships were realized through reciprocity, exchange and support (Moritz, 2010). This however, did not mean that conflicts between farmers and herders were non-existent (Bovin, 1990). Quite to the contrary, these relationships were characterized by both conflict and complementarity and were actually two faces of the same coin. Turner (2003) also reports that the relationships between farmers and herders in the Sub-Saharan Africa have always been multi-dimensional and like most social relationships they have involved both cooperation and conflict.

Hussein (1998) further posits that the relations between farmers and herders have always moved between cooperation, competition and conflicts. Tonah (2006) reports that in West Africa, for example, the conflicts between farmers and herders

have been a common feature of economic livelihoods in the area. These conflicts, however, were contained by customary institutions that were functioning following the principle of reciprocity and resolutions which were found within the confinement of the local communities. In addition, intermarriage between groups played part in strengthening these systems and increased the incentives to resolve the conflicts (Sandford and Ashley, 2008). Only in very rare cases were these conflicts brought to state administrative authorities for resolutions.

In recent decades farmer-herder conflicts<sup>1</sup> in many parts of Sub-Saharan Africa have escalated into widespread violence, loss of property, massive displacement of people and loss of lives (Hussein, Sumberg and Seddon, 2000). This situation has been caused by increasing pressure on resources and decreasing efficiency of traditional conflict-management mechanisms (Thebaud and Batterbury, 2001). Factors such as inadequate grazing reserve and stock routes; changes in land tenure system; insufficient legislation pastoralism; expansion in agricultural policies; economic factors and climate change have also been identified as the long-term causes of the conflicts. Hagberg (1998) argues that conflicts between farmers and herders originate from competition for resources caused by population growth, migration and land degradation. Davidheiser and Luna (2008) also cite factors such as international development projects, demographic changes, and environmental degradation to have contributed to the conflicts. More emphasis is placed on changes in production systems and land tenure regimes as central to the aggravation of farmer-herder goal incompatibility and inter-communal strife. Further analysis of the causes reveals that of the changes are the deliberate results of interventions and legislation that were based on Western models and intended to increase production outputs and market integration.

In Northern Africa the relationship between herders and farmers has, for centuries, been shaped by both *cooperation and violence* (Shettima and Tar, 2008). Recently however, strong population growth, wide-spread food insecurity and a recent series of drought events have increasingly challenged traditional resource sharing mechanisms while fights for scarce land resources have intensified (Fratkin and Roth, 2005; Herrero, 2006; ILRI, 2006).

In addition to the demographic and environmental factors for the conflicts two issues also emerge. One is the weakening of the traditional institutions for managing the conflicts, and the second is the changes in regimes of tenure on land. Ahmadu (2011) argues that in Nigeria as in many other parts of West Africa both farmers and herders believe that the evolution of modern state has altered their community-based traditional conflict management systems that developed on the sanctity of traditional norms and values. Even the mechanisms of resolving the

conflicts have been weakened and that the tendency is more toward calming down conflicts rather than solving them. There have been changes to communal land tenure regimes which have in turn, led to tensions and legal conflicts between farmers and herders. In most such situations the state actors are not neutral arbitrators but they are instrumental in the production of institutional uncertainty and create a discrepancy between resources in-flow and weak regulations which in turn generate room for opportunistic behaviors and conflict emergence (Meur et. al 2006).

#### IV. FARMER-HERDER CONFLICTS IN TANZANIA

The conflicts over land use especially between farmers and livestock keepers in the country are contributed by land tenure contradictions between customary and granted land rights (Simbarashe, 2012) and accumulation of land in the hands of big national and multinational companies, leaving small-scale producers landless (Chachage, 2010). These two problems have affected the pastoralists more than other resource users. Almost everywhere in the country, pastoralists are now losing their traditional grazing lands to sedentary farming and national reserves. The loss of land is also contributed by government's view that transhumance pastoralism is backwards and would like communities practicing it to change their way of life and settle in one place (Kipuri and Sørensen, 2008).



Traditionally, land use conflicts in the country were experienced in the margins between pastoral lands and protected lands, especially national parks in Northern Tanzania. In recent decades however, farmer-herder conflicts have increased in magnitude and spread southward and south eastwards of the country covering Kilosa, Mvomero, Kilombero districts of Morogoro Region, Kiteto District in Manyara Region, Rufiji and Mkuranga districts of Coast Region, Kilwa District in Lindi Region, Mbarali District in Mbeya Region and parts of Kongwa in Dodoma Region. Other districts include Handeni and Kilindi in Tanga Region. Farmer-herder conflicts are also occurring in parts of Rukwa and Tabora regions. What is most notable with these districts is that except for Mbarali, Kiteto and Kongwa districts none of the remaining districts fall into the category of what can be characterized as traditionally important areas for livestock keeping. That is, these conflicts are now being witnessed in predominantly crop cultivating areas which had no prior experience of livestock keeping, let alone experiences of other resource use conflicts. Indeed, this partly explains why farming communities label the herders as "invaders".

Such has been the magnitude of the conflicts that state intervention has been found necessary. For example, the government of Tanzania has, in several occasions made efforts to address the conflicts involving farmers and herders. One such measure has been the eviction of livestock (with their owners) from fragile ecosystems where the conflicts have been over the need to gain access to water. Eviction of livestock keepers from Ihefu and Kilombero wetlands are two such examples. In some other cases the government has been prompted to split village lands into areas for farmers and others for livestock keepers. Kambala village in Mvomero District offers such an experience where the village was split into two parts one for each of the

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<sup>1</sup> The term "conflict," is used as an umbrella term to encompass a range of phenomena like lack of convergence of goals, interests, and expectations among social groups; the intentional pursuit of actions or livelihood strategies that result in damage to others; open confrontations resulting from conflicting interests or damaging actions; and recourse to various forms of violence (Hagberg, 1998; Hussein, 1998).

major land uses – grazing and crop cultivation. Same measures were also applied in Sagamaganga village in Kilombero District where district leadership set aside one block of land for livestock keeping and another for crop cultivation. Setting aside land for the livestock keepers has gone hand in hand with nationwide campaigns to urge them to reduce their herd size in order to avoid conflicts with other resource users and safeguard the environment. In addition, there have been efforts to hasten the process of village land use planning for the purpose of having efficient utilization of land resources which in turn would contribute to lessening the conflicts between farmers and herders.

Despite these enthusiastic efforts by the government the conflicts have been escalating and the ensuing consequences are becoming socially and economically unbearable. In some extreme cases these conflicts have resulted into bloody clashes and loss of property and lives. A closer look into these interventions clearly reveals that very little has been done to seek solutions that go beyond just satisfying the parties' interests. As such they have failed to identify and deal with the underlying sources of the conflict. At best these interventions have been geared towards conflict management which involves the control, but not resolving the long-term and deep-rooted sources of the conflicts.

Efforts towards managing, or on some rare cases, resolving the farmer-herder conflicts have yielded dismal success largely because they are based on erroneous and misplaced understanding of the conflicts. In addition, government interventions have not addressed the underlying problem of lack of security of tenure for lands being used for different activities. A detailed account of the problems underlying government failure to resolve the conflicts is provided in the subsequent sections of this work.

## V. FACTORS FOR THE PERSISTENCE OF THE CONFLICTS

A number of factors have been identified to contribute to the persistence of farmer-herder conflicts in Tanzania. These factors include; policy deficiencies and contradictions, insecurity of land tenure, inadequacy of capacity of the local institutions, corrupt practices, lack of coordination in planning for resettlement, inadequate capacity in village land use planning, and the heavy-handed approaches used to resolve the conflicts. However, it is important to note that no single factor can adequately explain the persistence of the conflicts between farmers and herders over the years, instead a combined effects of these factors is responsible for the worsening situation.

### ***Policy deficiencies and contradictions***

The Land Policy in Tanzania (through the Land Act and Village Land Act in 1999) classifies land as: Reserved land; Village land; and General land. Reserved land is statutorily protected as national parks, land for public utilities, wildlife and game reserves and other land designated by sectoral legislation. Village land is the land which is within the demarcated or agreed boundaries of any of Tanzania's villages. This land is under the managerial authority of the Village Councils, which are answerable for land management decisions to the Village Assembly.

General land is a residual category and includes all public land which is not reserved land or village land *and includes unoccupied or unused village land*". The definition of General Land is ambiguous because *unoccupied or unused village land* is considered as "excess" and thus falls under the jurisdiction of the Land Commissioner rather than the village authorities. The seemingly unoccupied lands (village) may be important areas for seasonal livestock grazing, and other important livelihood uses (Mattee and Shem, 2006). Certainly this ignores the fact that as the population grows this "excess" village land will actually be brought into use. However, this is actually the same land which is, in most cases identified as suitable for agricultural investment. Not coincidentally and under the pretext of large scale agricultural investments the land belonging to farmers and pastoralists is subject to appropriation by state-backed investors. Thus, the pastoralists occupying semi-arid areas are often subject to efforts to alienate their customary pastures and land holdings, for purposes of commercial investments or establishment of wildlife conservation areas (Mattee and Shem, 2006). The land policy has some deficiencies because it does not guarantee security of tenure to some users, especially smallholder groups. In effect, these deficiencies have led large areas of land being given over to alternative uses and consequently marginalizing the pastoral populations (Bonfiglioli, 1992).

✚ Appropriation of land from pastoralists in Tanzania like elsewhere in Africa is usually backed by the enduring perception that pastoralism is an irrational, ecologically destructive and economically inefficient production system (Homewood 1995; Hesse and MacGregor, 2006). These perceptions have consequently resulted into efforts by government policy makers to re-distribute pastoral lands directly to commercial investors in the belief that this is an economically rational policy (Sulle and Nelson, 2009). The squeezing out of herders to give way to large scale seed farms in Arusha Region in Northern Tanzania typifies the argument here and bears witness to the limits of policy makers' understanding of the nature of pastoralism. Suffice to point out that as long as the pastoralists continue to be squeezed out of their traditional grazing lands migration into other parts of the country in search of pastures and the subsequent conflicts can't be avoided.

✚ Another area where policy deficiencies are conspicuously revealed is on the Grazing-Land and Animal Feed Resources Act which translates and implements the National Livestock Policy of 2006. The Act provides guidance for the management and control of grazing lands and animal feed resources. Some of the problems identified in the Act include the interpretation of the terms used. For example, the Act defines "communal grazing land" to mean a grazing land owned by a "livestock keeper" and it defines the "livestock keeper" as a person who engages on livestock keeping for "production." The term "production" is defined as rearing animals for commercial purpose. The pastoralists hence argue that the Act does not provide for the protection and promotion of pastoralism but exclusively focuses on commercial livestock keeping. It is argued that the persistence of farmer-herder conflicts in the country is a reflection of the

government's failure to strike a balance between the promotion of investment (of which private interests of government policy-makers may themselves be involved), and the land access interests of smallholder farmers and pastoralists.

In addition to policy deficiencies, there is also a problem of contradictions of the policies. This is supported by Lugoe's (2011) argument who asserts that there is some misalignment between the Livestock Policy (of 2006) and the National Land Policy. The Livestock Policy recognizes seasonal movement as an important characteristic of pastoralism and thus encourages livestock owners in overgrazed areas to move to lower stocked areas. The Livestock Policy has gone further and facilitated modalities for new settlements for pastoralists. In contrast to this spirit, the National Land Policy prohibits nomadism and all its different forms—modern or transhumant. Such contradictions help to sow seeds of hostilities between the pastoralists and implementers of the policies.

## VI. LACK OF SECURITY OF TENURE

At the root of the conflicts between farmers and herders is the lack of security on land that rural producers subsist on. Overall the objective of the land policy is to promote and ensure secured land tenure system that encourages optimal use of land resources and facilitate broad based social and economic development without upsetting or endangering the ecological balance of the environment (Land Policy 1999: 5 section 2.0). The problem of lack of security of tenure facing pastoral groups is best exemplified by eviction of Maasai pastoralists from eight villages of Soitsambu, Oloipiri, Ololosokwan, Loosito/Maaloni, Oloerien Magaiduru, Piyaya, Arash and Malambo in Loliondo District of northern Tanzania. These pastoralists have been occupying this land for over a hundred years. This ownership is legally recognized under the laws of Tanzania, in particular, the Land Act, Cap. 113, the Village Land Act, Cap. 114 and the Local Government (District Authorities) Act, Cap. 287. However, in total disregard of the importance of the grazing land to the livelihoods of pastoral groups the Government of Tanzania granted a commercial hunting license (to a foreign investor) on a land belonging to the eight registered villages. Having lost control of their land which was fundamental to their livelihoods, the evicted pastoralists have been forced to migrate into other parts of the country in search for livelihoods. Yet the same displaced people are being blamed for causing conflicts at the destination points, and this only amount to it is like blaming the victims of land alienation.

At the root of the problem of insecurity of land tenure is the emerging process of land grabbing which has been encroaching on local rights, marginalizing rural farmers and pastoralists who depend on land, water and other natural resources. This has been further emphasized by Nelson et al. (2012) Land-grabbing, with its links to corruption, preferential appropriation of public assets by state officials, and leading politicians' and ruling party financial interests, has been taken up as a central issue in public debates over governance and transparency. In the face of policy deficiencies the state-backed investments have all contributed to this malaise facing the smallholder producers.

## *Inadequate capacity of the local institutions*

The influx of livestock into areas which were once dominated by crop cultivators has contributed to the occurrence and persistence of conflicts between farmers and herders. This has been an inevitable outcome because the cultural values and attitudes which used to provide the basis for interaction and the norms by which individuals and communities live have been altered. At village level the traditional conflict resolution machinery has been weakened partly by the emergence of statutory approaches based on formal procedures, and on the other, by the influx of herders who do not share the values and beliefs upon which these mechanisms were anchored. Elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa, it has been also noted that land conflicts are proving more difficult to solve because traditional instruments of conciliation, such as compromise and consensus are failing. On the one hand, local institutions have largely lost their authority, and on the other, few institutional innovations have been developed (Kirk, 1999).

Resolving resource use conflicts at village level falls under the responsibility of the Village Environmental Committees. In all the villages covered by this study the Village Environment Committees are composed by both farmers and herders. In situations where these committees fail, then the cases are referred to next bodies in the hierarchy. It was revealed that none of the members of the committees had received any form of training on conflict resolution skills such as mediation and negotiations. In a number of places in the country the local institutions, such as the Village Environmental Committees, village governments and district machinery have shown to lack capacity to resolve the conflicts. This explains why only a small proportion of the conflicts are resolved at this level. This is actually how the village government leadership comes in. The members of this hierarchical stage too are not equipped with any skills related to conflict resolution. Members of the village government are selected by the villagers and given the higher population of the farmers relative to that of herders even the village government leadership is dominated by crop cultivators. This is a point of contention, especially from the perspective of herders who argue that they are not fairly represented in the village governments and hence their reluctance to cooperate in resolving the conflicts. Underlying these problems is the fact that the statutory procedures of sustaining peaceful and mutual relations have not been strong enough to replace the traditional conflict resolution mechanisms. Elsewhere in Kenya Murithi (2006) underscores that with the disappearance of indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms the tranquility as underscored by the principles of reciprocity, inclusivity and a sense of shared destiny between people remain elusive.

The inadequacy of capacity of local institutions to resolve the farmer–herder conflicts is further compounded by the mistrust that exists between the conflicting parties. The general attitude of herders towards the village governments is negative. *"We would have liked our court cases to be decided and resolved at district level because village government leadership tends to favor farmers, especially in setting the amount of compensation for crop damage. In addition, whenever we demand our rights the village leadership calls in the police but the problems remain"*. On the other hand, the farmers too do not trust district level officials whom they accuse to favour the herders. *"District*

*level officials always favor the herders because the livestock is a new source of revenue, and in some ways these officials may have full knowledge on the actual owners of part of the livestock herds. In this way these officials work with full orders from high ranking politicians who may also own part of the livestock, and thus contributing to the arrogance of the herders*". Two things are evident in this hierarchical process of resolving the conflicts. First, local institutions lack capacity in terms of negotiating and mediation skills that are important in conflict resolutions. Second, both the herders and farmers do not trust the local institutions, both at village and district levels, and this partly explains the reluctance to cooperate in resolving the conflicts.

#### ***Nature of approaches used to resolve and manage the conflicts***

Part of the reasons for the persistence of farmer – herder conflicts lies in the way the conflicts are being handled. The use of excessive force involving the police is not only unsustainable but also deepens the hatred between the conflicting parties. At best this approach is good for imposing short-lived peace but the problems still remain. This is not uncommon in Sub-Saharan Africa; otherwise Moritz (2003) provides evidence on the nature of government responses to farmer – herder in Nigeria where army and the police are used to manage or sometimes to resolve the conflicts. At the district level, the management of farmer-herder conflicts nearly throughout the country is dealt with by the District Defense and Security Committee. The members of the committee are the Militia Advisor, District Executive Director, District Prisons Commander, Police, The Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB) and District Security Officer. Such a composition shows a heavy military presence with very little or none use of mediating or even negotiating skills. In some cases this may appear like a military operation – thus causing further problems of hatred between the conflicting parties and towards the government in general.

#### ***Corruption and ‘politics of the belly’***

Corrupt practices also contribute to the persistence of farmer-herder conflicts. This problem can be looked at from two perspectives –at village level involving local leadership, and higher levels of government involving highly placed politicians and government leaders (politics of the belly). At the local level village leadership has the responsibility of maintaining peace and security. This also entails fair allocation of land to different uses. In the wake of the influx of livestock then village leadership has the responsibility of ensuring that there is a balance between the number of livestock herds and the available resources. In all villages covered by this study there were complains that village leaders had received bribes to allow large herds of cattle well beyond the capacity of the village resources to support. Another area of discontent and where corrupt practices are believed to exist is the assessment of damage to crops caused by livestock. In nearly all villages studied herders complained that village leaders receive bribes from farmers to exaggerate the damages in order to get higher compensation. On the other hand, farmers also accuse district level leadership of receiving bribes from herders to have their court cases settled in their favour. Maganga (2007) had earlier noted this problem in Mvomero district that corruption had the effect of undermining people’s trust in

authorities and the willingness of these authorities to prevent conflicts.

The second perspective of corruption involves influential politicians well beyond the village level. This is described using the phrase ‘politics of the belly’. This is an expression implied in the proverb ‘goats eat where they are tethered’ (Bayart, 1993) to describe a system where officials on different levels systematically exploit political power and authority, and appropriate public resources for their own benefits and purposes, or more specifically; “accumulation of wealth through tenure of political power”. Under this system an individual especially politicians negotiate the institutional ambiguity and complexity to pursue their own interests (Moritz, 2006). It is further argued that that ‘Belly politics’ is based on a hierarchy in which “smallholders are steadily losing out to the wealthy, powerful, and better connected elite, who are much better positioned in these ‘negotiations’(Moritz, 2006). This situation is also evident in the districts covered by this study.

*Kambala village in Mvomero district is one of the areas where farmer-herder conflicts have led to loss of property and lives. Part of the solution to resolve the conflicts involved splitting the village land into two villages, one for herders and another for farmers. Later on, there were allegations that some district and regional leaders acquired the land that had been set aside for pastoralists. Large scale farms were established and thus causing further squeezing out of the herders, and thereby causing more conflicts. Obviously the politicians and businessmen had taken advantage of the village lacking land use plans and these made it easy to process and obtain title deeds. With these documents in their hands these politically influential people have a more secure access and control of the land than the original owners – the farmers and herders. With lesser land available for the ever growing demand escalation of the conflicts could not be avoided. Therefore, seemingly good solution for the conflicting parties ended to benefit the “mediators” – government officers and influential business people in the area.*

Some administrative officials are also accused of making financial gains from conflicts. For example, local politicians looking for votes often promise farmers they would expel the strangers. Benjaminsen and Boubacar (2008) point out that government officials may indeed use their powers to exploit institutional ambiguity to the detriment of the poor in farmer herder land use rivalry, and argue that in order to understand the origins and catalysts of the conflict it is important to know also the interests and motives of individual actors in the process of protection and assurance of rights. In a number of districts covered by this study the district level officers reported that they can’t reveal so openly the results of their investigations on the conflicts for fear of either being transferred to more remote districts or even losing their jobs. Part of the explanation for this fear is that in some villages, part of the livestock herds belong to highly placed politicians and government leaders.

#### ***Lack of coordination in resettling the herders***

As part of the solution to halt the degradation of wetlands in Kilombero basin and Ihefu water catchments in Usangu plain the government ordered the eviction of livestock herds from these ecologically fragile areas. These herders were later settled in Kilwa and Rufiji districts in the south of the country. However,

there wasn't adequate planning and sensitization of the host communities prior to the resettlements of herders. In effect, this approach was tantamount to shifting the problem from one area to another. For example, the eviction of livestock herds from Usangu plains and Kilombero valley contributed to the emergence of resource use conflicts in the destination areas of Rufiji River basin.

The farmers in Rufiji district complained that there were no consultations with the host communities prior to the resettlement of the herders from Kilombero and Usangu areas. Without such plans the host communities felt that they had been invaded by herders with the assistance of the government. A major point of complaint is that the livestock has contributed to degradation of rice fields and consequently leading to reduced productivity of the land. Seemingly trivial as this may appear, it has contributed to the growth of hatred between the host and 'stranger' communities because it has had negative impacts to the livelihoods of the former group.

The ensuing conflicts between farmers and herders are further complicated by the fact that parts of the lands in Rufiji district have been allocated to investors for biofuels production. In effect this means less land for both the farmers and herders. The presence of the Selous Game Reserve in the south western side of Rufiji district also means limited space for the expansion of farming land and at the same time puts limits to the mobility of livestock. With more herds of livestock flowing in the district there is less land available per capita. Under such circumstances farmer – herder conflicts become inevitable.

The conflicts involving herders and farmers in Kilwa and Rufiji Districts have taken two dimensions all of which have the effect of perpetuating rivalry between the groups; First dimension is the economic differences between farmers and herders and that the conflicts are now between the rich (herders) and the poor (farmers) or "rich invaders" (and mostly stigmatized as arrogant) against "poor hosts". In most areas affected by conflicts a herder is almost synonymous with a rich person and the farmer is considered poor and this creates a situation of arrogance on the one hand and inferiority on the other, but then discontents between parties still remain. The second dimension is that the conflicts involve groups with different cultures (particularly religion) and that the conflicts are also looked at as ethno-religious or cultural clashes. While ethnic and religious differences may not be very significant factors in explaining the persistence of the conflicts, they are often used by host communities to draw attention and organize collective support among themselves against the 'invaders'.

## VII. LACK OF VILLAGE LAND USE PLANS

The persistence of farmer-herder conflicts is also a result of villages lacking land use plans. Village land use planning is widely accepted as useful tool for rational allocation of land resources to various uses and for promotion of sustainable utilization of resources. This tool has the potential to prevent resource use conflicts among users. However, this is an expensive undertaking and Mango and Kalenzi (2011) report that the average cost per village stands at Tshs 7 million, and this is far more than most villages could afford. With these limitations there is little control in resource use, especially in the face of

growing rural population and the consequent increase in the demand for resources.

## VIII. CONCLUSION

Explanation for the persistence and escalation of farmer-herder conflicts in Tanzania have been sought in the confinement demographic and environmental factors. A deeper analysis of the conflicts however, reveals that these factors are only secondary causes. The findings show that the root cause of the conflicts lies mostly in the lack of security of tenure on land that most smallholder producers depend for their livelihoods. Policy deficiencies and contradictions have been exploited by corrupt elite to the detriment of the poor farmers and livestock keepers. In particular, the effects of state-backed land grabbing for large scale agricultural investments and corrupt practices at village and district levels have all contributed to the squeezing out of herders from their traditional grazing lands. The effects of such misplacement have had their ripples felt in farmer communities in the form of resource use conflicts. It is also concluded that in the absence of land use plans for most villages in the country coupled with lack of coordination in resettling the displaced migrant herders, conflicts with farmers in an inevitable outcome. Therefore, unless security of tenure on land used by smallholders (both farmers and herders) is restored the conflicts between them will continue. This is necessary in order to prevent the conflicts from assuming a political dimension, a situation which will become uncontrollable.

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