Implementing social protection in pastoralist areas: how local distribution structures moderate PSNP outcomes in Ethiopia

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Abstract

Widespread poverty and vulnerability in pastoralist areas highlight the need to extend the provision of social protection to these populations. Using mixed methods we show that a program design predicated on experiences in agrarian areas, Ethiopia's Productive Safety Nets Programme, does not readily transfer to pastoral areas because of the nature of distributional channels in these localities. We focus on three: practices of sharing within mutual support networks, the important role of informal authority structures in targeting and appeals decisions, and gendered dimensions of livelihoods and decision-making. We show how these have substantial implications for the design, delivery and outcomes of standard social protection programmes that aim to build the assets of chronically food insecure households.

Key words: Africa, Ethiopia, pastoralists, social protection, targeting, women

1. INTRODUCTION

There are approximately 120 million pastoralists and agro-pastoralists worldwide of whom 50 million live in sub-Saharan Africa.[1] They live in environments characterized by multiple risks, including climatic shocks, human and zoonotic diseases, uncertain market access and conflict over access to natural resources. Most are poor. Rass (2006, Annex 6) estimates that there are 18.9 and 32.6 million African pastoralists with consumption levels below $1US and $2US per day respectively, implying that 37 per cent are extremely poor and 65 per cent are poor.

The combination of vulnerability to multiple shocks and high rates of poverty would seem to make pastoral communities natural candidates for social protection interventions. Building largely on theories of asset accumulation and asset thresholds, (Carter and Barrett, 2006; Moser, 1998) social protection is perceived to have the potential to reduce the vulnerability of poor people to the extent that they can manage moderate risk and move into more productive livelihoods (Barrientos and Hulme, 2008; Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux, 2008). Underpinning this view is a theory of change which posits that if sufficient resources (income and/or assets) are provided to targeted beneficiaries, poor individuals and households will be able to build their asset base, thus building resilience to future shocks. The regularity of predictable payments will insure against downside risk and enable beneficiaries to move into activities with a higher return/higher productivity. Over time beneficiaries' lives and livelihoods will be transformed in a sustainable way, allowing them to support themselves so they are able to 'graduate' off external support (Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux, 2011). This standardised theory of change, which reflects the smallholder contexts in which large-scale 'productive safety net' programmes have

been developed, assumes that their design and implementation is readily transferable. But is such an assumption warranted in the particular contexts of pastoral and agro-pastoral localities? Little literature exists on this topic.[2]

Ethiopia is a country well suited to assessing how well existing social protection practice can be applied to pastoral regions. It has a sizeable population of pastoralists -approximately four million (Rass, 2006) – the third largest in sub-Saharan Africa. They are poor and vulnerable to the multiple shocks described above. Most importantly, Ethiopia is the first country in sub-Saharan Africa to extend a social protection instrument – the Productive Safety Nets Programme –to a pastoral population. The programme design is largely based on implementation experiences in agrarian settings in the country's highland areas, where the livelihood context and nature of vulnerability are different. While there are clearly good reasons for providing social protection to vulnerable populations in lowland areas, using mixed methods we show that a program design predicated on experiences in agrarian areas cannot be expected to easily transplant into pastoral areas. This is primarily due to the nature of distribution and extent of sharing in remote lowland areas that can undermine the realisation of programme outcomes. These distributional channels (based on differentiated livelihood systems) present themselves in multiple ways.

In this paper, we highlight three. First, the practice of sharing food and other consumable resources between extended household and clan structures is endemic to survival and risk management within this lowland context, which implies that programme transfers are likely to be diluted. Second, local status and clan-based structures regulate and broker the patterns of access to resources, essentially

through influencing targeting systems. Third, access to social provision, as well as decision making concerning rules of provision, is strictly gendered. These three distribution channels have substantial implications for the expected outcomes of standard social protection systems. We focus on these three issues in the paper, cognisant, of course, that these are but three of many possible livelihood dynamics that are prevalent in these areas.

2. DATA SOURCES AND METHODS

There are three distinguishing features of the data sources and methods used in this paper. First, nearly all results are based on primary data collection undertaken between November 2010 and January 2011. Second, mixed methods—data collection techniques using both qualitative and quantitative methods—have been employed. Doing so provides a richer pool of data and greater analytic power than would have been available with either of these methods used alone. Third, we adopt a "cascading" approach whereby data are collected at all levels: regional, *woreda*[3], *kebele*, household, and individual.

The qualitative assessment was conducted in ten *woredas* in Afar and Somali Regional States. These were sampled from a set of *woredas* covered by the quantitative household survey. Their selection took into account different livelihoods, the extent to which the PSNP has been implemented and security considerations. Two criteria were used to select *kebeles* within these *woredas*. The primary criteria were *kebeles* where administrative data showed that there were the highest population of PSNP beneficiaries and availability of diverse and large number of public works. This was further refined by secondary criteria including accessibility,

availability of majority of the community members at the time of assessment and safety of fieldworkers.

The qualitative fieldwork included a livelihoods analysis and an assessment of experiences with the PSNP. Information was obtained primarily through key informant interviews (KII) and focus group discussions (FGD). The livelihoods analysis drew on information collected with community leaders and, separately, focus groups with women and men. Key informant interviews were held at the regional and *woreda* level regarding the PSNP. Focus groups with program beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries, women and men were also held. In all, there were 36 FGDs that focused on livelihoods and 53 that examined experiences with the PSNP.

In Afar, a list of all 45 *woredas* with the numbers of PSNP beneficiaries was constructed. Ten *woredas* were randomly sampled proportional to beneficiary populations (PPS). In those *woredas* selected, the Ethiopian Central Statistics Agency (who implemented the quantitative instruments with support from the research team) attempted to obtain lists of beneficiary households, both to aid enumeration area (EA) selection and also the identification of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. It was not possible for CSA to obtain these. Instead three EAs in each *woreda* were randomly selected. Within each EA, household lists were compiled and checked and 30 households selected at random except for one woreda where four EAs were selected and one where only two were included.

After a lengthy series of discussions, eight *woredas* were identified that met the following criteria for inclusion in the Somali component of the quantitative study: the PSNP operated in the *woreda*; there were no security issues associated with fielding a survey; and CSA had the capacity to implement the survey in that

woreda. The last criteria meant that the 'universe' of *woredas* to be sampled from was biased towards agro-pastoral areas and with more purely pastoral areas excluded. The following quantitative survey instruments were fielded in both Afar and Somali: a *woreda*-level quantitative capacity survey; a quantitative community survey; a community price questionnaire; and a household survey instrument administered to 900 households in Afar and 700 in Somali.

3. THE PRODUCTIVE SAFETY NETS PROGRAMME

Between 1993 and 2004, the Government of Ethiopia launched near-annual emergency appeals for food aid and other forms of emergency assistance. While these succeeded in averting mass starvation, especially among the asset-less, they did not banish the threat of further famine and they did not prevent asset depletion by marginally poor households affected by adverse rainfall shocks. Further, the ad hoc nature of these responses meant that the provision of emergency assistance—often in the form of food-for-work programmes—was not integrated into ongoing economic development activities (Subbarao and Smith 2003). Starting in the Highlands in 2005, the Government of Ethiopia and a consortium of donors implemented a new response to chronic food insecurity in rural Ethiopia. Rather than annual appeals for assistance and ad hoc distributions, a new program called the Productive Safety Nets Programme (PSNP) was established.

The objective of the PSNP is "… to provide transfers to the food insecure population in chronically food insecure woredas in a way that prevents asset depletion at the household level and creates assets at the community level" (GFDRE, 2004, 2009a, 2010). Unlike the annual emergency appeals, it was conceived as a

multi-year program so as to provide recipients with predictable and reliable transfers. In selecting these beneficiaries, geographic and community targeting is used. The program operates in the most food insecure woredas in rural Ethiopia defined in terms of their past history of food aid needs. Within these localities, local committees called "Kebele Food Security Task Forces" choose beneficiaries. While there are program-wide targeting criteria, these task forces have discretion in how these are applied. Most beneficiary households do Public Works (PW): criteria for selection into these are that these households are poor (for example, they have low holdings of land and/or cattle) and food insecure but they also have able-bodied labor power. A much smaller proportion of beneficiaries receive Direct Support (DS): these households are poorer than those receiving public works employment and lack labor power; this includes those whose primary income earners are elderly or disabled. From 2005-2007, the PW component paid beneficiaries either 6 birr per day (increased to 8 birr in 2008 and 10 birr in 2010) in cash or three kilograms of cereals for work (depending on where they lived) on labor-intensive projects building community assets.

In 2010, a new targeting rule that all members of eligible PSNP households should be listed as clients of the program. This rule is known as "full family targeting" (FFT). The reasoning behind introducing the new rule was to help client households to graduate by providing a transfer for every household member and prevent dilution of transfers. If a household or individual receives less than the full amount, and the transfer becomes 'diluted' across more household members or more households than it is supposed to be, then the impetus for building livelihood sustainability will be weakened and the potential for graduation will similarly be

weakened. In other words, there is a trade-off between covering many households with smaller amounts of transfer per household member, versus targeting less households with higher (and appropriately calculated) levels of transfer for all household members.

The Direct Support component of the PSNP was extended to Afar in 2006 and, on a pilot basis the Public Works and Direct Support components were extended to Somali in 2008. By 2010, the PSNP was supposed to be fully functioning in all *woredas* that were surveyed. Crucially, however, the document governing the implementation of the PSNP in Afar and Somali, the Program Implementation Manual (PIM), was the same document used in the Highland regions.

4. PASTORALIST LIVELIHOOD SYSTEMS IN AFAR AND SOMALI

The success of social protection interventions, such as the PSNP, depend in part on how well they calibrate to the dynamics of livelihoods and the nature and types of vulnerability in specific contexts. From the outset, a challenge for introducing a fully-functional safety net in the Ethiopian lowlands was to design and implement the PSNP according to a better understanding of the vulnerabilities and risks in pastoral livelihoods. A further difficulty was to design the programme in a way that it could respond to the needs of people following *very different* livelihoods. Contrary to received wisdom, only a small proportion of lowland populations pursue a purely 'pastoralist' livelihood in the way of keeping and moving livestock across the rangeland to access fodder and water. Livelihoods in the lowlands have long been more complex. For example, the long-term engagements of pastoralism with

agriculture, including irrigated agriculture, is well documented (Sandford, 2012), as is the differential participation in markets, including across national borders (Catley and Aklilu, 2012; McPeak and Little, 2006), and harvesting of natural products such as aloe, honey and gums and resins.

The dominant theme that emerges from the qualitative work – and a theme consistent with findings by others (Aklilu and Catley, 2010; Catley and Aklilu, 2012) - is the sense that the pastoral lowlands of Afar and Somali are experiencing a significant transformation. In spite of still limited road infrastructure over large areas of these regions, investments aimed at improving the road network are opening up these regions to increased trade, economic activity and investment by the state as well as domestic and international actors. The expansion of the mobile telephone network has also improved accessibility and supported the flow of goods and people [as the quantitative survey indicates, just over 10 percent of our sample in Afar and Somali Regions own a mobile phone]. The opening of the pastoral lowlands, particularly for plantation agriculture and irrigation schemes has provided opportunities for new wealth accumulation and value-added diversification. Outlying towns such as Negale, Moyale and Gode are booming. Improved accessibility has coincided with a boom in domestic and export markets for livestock. Since the conflict in Darfur in neighboring Sudan flared, shutting down a vital supply of camels for markets in North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, there has been a significant increase in exports of live camels from Ethiopia. Livestock keepers in Somali region, who have long been connected to broader regional markets through cross-border trade into Somaliland, have seized the opportunity.

But not everyone has been able to access new opportunities to create wealth and add value to herds. Further, due to multiple pressures and trends, a majority of the population has suffered from diminishing livestock assets, which has necessitated the search for new activities to compensate for the loss of livelihood and income from livestock. Some have shifted into farming, largely because of government support. Social stratification is worsening alongside economic transition and expanding opportunities for some, with the better-off, 'middle' and poor following different pathways (Catley and Aklilu, 2012). Sections of the population considered to be 'better-off', whose assets are significantly greater than they are for other groups, pursue broadly similar livelihood activities (Table 1) focusing on livestock production for marketing and trade. In agro-pastoral areas that are well-connected to regional towns, they concentrate on cash crops such as *khat*, vegetables, fruits and groundnuts, in addition to livestock marketing. Groups that are considered to be 'in the middle' focus on livestock-keeping but compared to the better-off they have smaller herds particularly of camels and cattle. Where opportunities exist, they also cultivate small irrigated plots, and engage in market activities such as grain trade, petty trade and animal fatting, as well as sale of fuelwood and charcoal.

** Table 1 about here **

As social differentiation has worsened, the livelihoods of the poor and destitute have become more insecure as prime grazing environments have come under cultivation for sugar and fodder. While wealthier herders have been more able to negotiate these constraints by purchasing fodder and paying fees to access private boreholes or attain water from tankers, or hiring labor to move livestock over longer

distances, the poor have been less able to manage these pressures and their livelihoods have become even more insecure. Those considered to be poor typically keep a small herd of small-stock, and some also farm, but usually plots that are of poorer drainage and soil quality and further from the source of irrigation water. The growth of small towns in the lowlands has provided an important outlet for poorer sections of society to deepen their involvement in various tasks-for-cash such as collecting and selling fuelwood and grass, burning charcoal, petty trade, or working as guards and house-help for the better off. But the income generated from these activities is typically meagre and do not provide a basis for creating a new sustainable livelihood (Devereux, 2006).

** Figure 1 about here **

The quantitative household survey provides evidence consistent with the qualitative data's description of differentiation. Figure 1a shows that in Afar mean livestock holdings among the second richest and richest TLU deciles are 30.4 and 61.8 respectively. By contrast, the bottom four deciles have, on average, less than 4.2 animals. Not surprisingly then, as Figure 1b shows, the wealthiest 30 percent of households own more than 75 percent of livestock while the poorest 50 percent have only 10.8 percent of all livestock. As suggested by the qualitative work, while ownership of small stock is widespread, there is a strong correlation between being in the wealthier TLU quintiles and ownership of more valuable forms of livestock such as camels. In Afar, livestock is also unequally distributed when we consider sex of household head. Female-headed households are found disproportionately in the lower quintiles of the wealth distribution and male-headed households disproportionately found in the wealthier quintiles.

** Figure 2 about here **

Comparing Figures 1a and 2a, we see that livestock holdings are smaller in sampled Somali households than in Afar for households in the upper half of the distribution of TLU. But holdings in Somali are also unequally distributed. The wealthiest 30 percent of households own 71 percent of livestock while the poorest 50 percent have only 12.5 percent of all livestock (Figure 2b). Further, evidence from elsewhere in Somali region suggests that these wealth differences are widening, with poorer households having to attain greater numbers of livestock to stay in the commercializing system (Catley and Aklilu, 2012). Consistent with what we observe in Afar, while ownership of smallstock is widespread, the richest households own oxen, cows and especially camels. As in Afar, female-headed households were disproportionately found in the lower quintiles and male-headed households disproportionately found in the wealthier quintiles. While female-headed households comprise 24.8 of sampled households in Somali, 40.9 percent of households in the poorest quintile are female-headed.

5. RESULTS FROM THE FIELD

(a) The cultural practice of sharing and its implications for the PSNP

Sharing of food and other consumable resources between extended household and clan structures is widespread. Social scientists have long noted that such network based systems can be efficiency enhancing because the trust/reciprocity characteristics minimize government involvement and monitoring and makes the most of local knowledge (Baland and Platteau, 1996). Network-based affiliation and distribution provide important functions under high levels of uncertainty. For

example, in pastoral societies of the Horn of Africa, livestock exchanges and gift giving, as well as mutual help, are ways to concretise important social ties that are drawn upon during multi-year droughts as well as seasonal downturns in herd productivity (Dahl and Hjort, 1976; Broch-Due, 1999). The practice of sharing reflects both customs to give when one can, and the concomitant expectation of receiving help in the future by giving to friends, neighbours and kin today, as well as the prominence given to alms giving in Islamic religious thought. Various social provisioning systems are rooted in cultural norms, for instance livestock exchanges within a network of extended family, bond friends, and clans or sections of larger ethnic groups. Pooling of resources and mutual assistance (for example, savings groups, burial societies, fostering and childcare) can provide an element of protection against loss and expand entitlements for a particular individual or household, during 'bad' years or more protracted livelihood crises.

The qualitative work provided ample evidence that such sharing is widespread, although the level of assistance is typically small. Focus groups unanimously reported that households share food payments with relatives and neighbours who are not registered for the PSNP. Sharing of resources is widely practiced in the lowlands regardless of wealth status, specific locations or livelihoods that are followed in different places. Informal support is often provided at specific times in the year, such as at the end of Ramadan and in response to events such as marriage or orphanhood. The size of resource/food shared with non-PSNP households varies from household to household. Although levels of support are quite small generally, one respondent reported that he received seven bags of wheat for three months payment and out of this he gave away three bags of wheat to his

brother. Likewise, a focus group participant in Somali region indicated that she gave 50kg of food out of her 150kg food payment to her mother. These are significant amounts that are shared and much more substantial than intra-households transfers reported in a highland study of the same kind (Berhane et al, 2011). Quotations from focus group discussions illustrate the extent and nature of these network-based systems of sharing and provision.

> Relatives come from other places when they hear that we have received food and we give away some portion of the food. [S-S/FG-3][4]

> In our culture we eat together. We share. There is no lending. What we have we eat with our neighbors. For example when I receive one sack of wheat I share with my neighbor whether she/ he asks me or not. It is our culture to share what we have. [AF-EL/FG-4]

> We support each other in terms of labor, money and food. People who have food, milk, even tea and salt give for those who may not have. We share everything we have for each other. This type of support among the Afar community, we call it *Etel Kumaliyo* [AF-B/women].

> In our culture no one eats alone. We share what we have [AF-EL/MEN].

In all, men's and women's focus groups identified 20 forms of informal social support: *zakat* (obligation of Muslims to share assets with the poor); *fidri* (religious

payment at the end of Ramadan to the poor); *karsinta* (a gift made to the poor in the name of Allah); *dabarso* (a custom where someone asks for lactating camel); *edbonta* (clan based system of restocking herds of households who suddenly lost livestock); *irr* (relatives of a poor person contribute livestock to help him); *xoolo-goyn* (livestock given to poor families from relatives); *amaki* (in-kind credit provided during times of acute shortage); *harati* (a gift to new couples provided by relatives); *cayma* (a gift of livestock to the groom at time of marriage); *kaallo* (a gift of livestock at time of marriage as described by women's focus groups); *alaa* (giving gifts to friends); *hori dhess* (women providing assistance in the construction of traditional houses); *goob* - labor sharing during planting or harvesting; providing a donkey for transportation services such as taking charcoal or firewood to the market; *roob doon* (remittances); blood money compensation; *idido* or *yetim* (money collected for orphans); and more general forms of support described in focus groups as cash support, food support (including the provision of cooked meals), livestock support and money lending.

While this qualitative evidence confirms the importance of various forms of sharing in Afar and Somali societies, as stated previously people generally give small amounts of help in kind, an indication that traditional social support systems are declining as production systems commercialize and the numbers of those requiring assistance grows. Catley and Aklilu (2012) report the findings of early warning survey data from Shinile agropastoral zone, which shows that gifts of cash and food declined from 15% of the income of poor households in 1998-1999 to 5% in 2004-2005. Further, in lowland Hawd pastoral livelihood zone, no food gifts were recorded since 1998-1999, or in Shabale riverine livelihood zone since 1999-2000. Yet,

Devereux (2006) found that *zakat* contributions were important for Somali pastoralists following drought and livestock disease outbreaks between 1995 and 2005.

What happens to hypothesized program outcomes when social protection systems are implemented in contexts where social networks and relational- based access to social provision are the predominant form of distribution? Recall that a core feature of the PSNP is Full Family Targeting (FFT). "If a household is identified as chronically food insecure and eligible for PSNP all household members will be listed as clients of the program" (GFDRE 2010, 25). Officials in both Afar and Somali clearly understood the reasons behind FFT.

> We realized that if we do not practice full family targeting, graduation will not happen. And if graduation is not happening, the whole objective of the program will not be met. So this is why we tried to go with the full family targeting by leaving out some needy people. [Sm-DO/W-FGD 1]

Full family targeting implies that transfer levels should rise with household size. Figure 3 shows, however that apart from one *woreda*, Shinile, there is no relationship between transfer size and the number of people residing in a household.[5]

** Figure 3 about here **

Officials gave two reasons why FFT was not more widely followed. One related to tension between implementing FFT and the need to cover a large number of chronically food insecure households in a situation in which they perceived

program resources to be inadequate. This led to the exclusion of some members of PSNP households, a practice that officials commonly refer to as 'partial family targeting', a conscious decision to increase coverage with limited resources available, as a *woreda* official in Afar explained:

> Yes, we know about FFT but it is not being implemented due to the limited quota for the *woreda*. The failure to implement FFT is affecting the contribution of the program to reducing the food gap at household level. [Af-EW/W-FGD 1]

The second reason given was the practice of sharing described above. Targeting was undermined by the intense pressure to give within networks of the poorest. This pressure relates to social norms that make informal support contingent on giving when one can and being seen to be generous. The object is not to hold onto transfers but to share in the expectation that this will strengthen claims to informal support in the future. One official commented, "People share whatever they are getting. Thus, full family targeting is difficult." [OR-R/KI-1] Another noted:

> In our society especially in rural areas there is a resource sharing culture. Moreover, there are no significant wealth variations among a majority of the community members. Thus, in our case we believe that food security can be realized at the community level not at the household level as it is stated in the program document (PSNP PIM). When it comes to Afar food security has to be viewed in this way. In Afar almost everything is communal. [A-R/KI-1]

A participant of a focus group in Buremudaitu, Afar explained:

> According to our culture and society, we believe that what we are doing now is good. You eat from my pocket and I eat from your pocket. Those who have

nothing to eat take from those who have. But the right way of giving support for the community is to give for each family member by measuring in kilo. [Af-Bm/K-FGD 1]

Statements such as these should not be viewed uncritically. Although sharing is perceived to be widespread, what we often are talking about is very minimal – albeit important – assistance in terms of childcare, grain, sugar, fuel wood, cash being provided within and amongst a section of the population that is very poor or destitute. None of this is to discount the importance of sharing obligations for understanding the possibly limited impact of PSNP transfers in assisting targeted households – rather, it underlines the intense pressure within horizontal networks to give and support, since future support within these networks is contingent on being seen to be generous and giving when one can. The object is not to hoard assistance, but to share this widely in the expectation that will strengthen claims in the future.

So while sharing can expand or deepen claims to forms of informal assistance in the future, the pressures to share in these environments – with its concomitant pressure on officials to ensure that most households are included - risked diluting the level of transfers provided to any one household. This is precisely what occurred. Using data from the quantitative household survey, Table 2 lists, by *woreda*, the number of surveyed households and the numbers and percentages who report receiving Public Works payments and Direct Support transfers over an 11 month period (January 2010 to November 2010). The percentage of households receiving any type of transfer is, in many *woredas*, strikingly high. The *woreda* with the lowest coverage rate (public works plus direct support) is Afdem with just over 50 percent of households receiving a PSNP transfer. In four *woredas*, coverage exceeds 70

percent and in Shinile, it is nearly universal. By contrast, in the highland regions of Ethiopia, the *woreda*-level median program coverage is only 19 percent and fewer than six percent of *woredas* provide transfers to more than half of their households.

** Table 2 about here **

** Table 3 about here **

** Figure 4 about here **

The household survey recorded the amount of grain payments received over the same period. Table 3 shows the number of Public Works beneficiaries for each *woreda* where at least one household reported receiving payment for undertaking Public Works. It also shows the mean amount, in kilograms, of grains received mean household size and the mean number of payments Public Works beneficiaries received. Mean payments, in terms of kilograms of grain, range from 19.9 (Harshin) to 178.1 (Afdem). However, once we account for household size, payment levels are low in most *woredas*. The exception is Afdem which also has the lowest coverage. Figure 4 builds on this observation, plotting coverage rates at the *woreda* level against per capita grain payments. As coverage rates rise, per capita grain payments fall. This is consistent with the trade-off described by *woreda* and *kebele* officials; the tension between implementing FFT and the need to cover a large number of chronically food insecure households.

(b) Informal authority structures and their implications for program access

Recall from section 2 that the PSNP is a targeted intervention. While local communities have some discretion in the allocation of program resources, targeting is to be informed by the criteria laid out in the Programme Implementation Manual

(PIM). Most notably, program resources are not intended for well-off households as measured by land and livestock holdings. Targeting itself is to be carried out by the KFSTFs. Regional and *woreda* officials stressed that while traditional leaders play a key role, they are not supposed to supplant formal targeting structures. However, in a substantial number of *kebeles* officials stated that the number of beneficiaries and the size of transfer per household are determined by clan leaders who work closely with the *Kebele* Food Distribution Committee (KFDC) or KFSTF:

> We have a representative from each clan and they select the pastoralists to carry out the selection of beneficiaries. [Af-BM/K-KI-1-KRDC]

> Targeting is based on the clan. Everyone in the *kebele* is assisted. What matters is the amount of assistance they receive. The decision on the ration size depends on the size of the family. Larger families or families raising orphaned children get more assistance. For households with sick members, sometimes we give them more grains and help them to get to the health center. They can sell the grain and use the money for medical purposes. The clan determines who needs assistance the most. [Af-BM/K-KI-2-DA]

In several *kebeles* where additional resources had been provided for the management and implementation of the PSNP, traditional authority structures and the Food Security Task Forces jointly took responsibility for targeting:

> A community gathering was called, in which the clan leader *Dalla Aba* (sub-*kebele* structure) and KFSTF facilitated a discussion on targeting. [Af-EW/K-KI-1-KFSTF]

> Targeting was conducted by the *Kebele* targeting committee. The *Kebele* level clan leader, who is also member of the *Kebele* FSTF and targeting committees, has played a key role in targeting. The sub clan leaders at the village level screened potential beneficiaries and provided the list to the *Kebele* Targeting Committee through the *Kebele* level clan leader for approval. [Af-TR/K-KI-1-KFSTF]

Is there evidence that the involvement of these informal authority structures affects targeting outcomes? We aggregate data on livestock holdings into deciles and compare them to the likelihood that a household received Public Works or Direct Support payments in the eleven month period that followed (January – November 2010). Results are shown in Figure 5.

** Figure 5 about here **

Based on the PIM and discussions with key informants, we would expect that, for the poorest quintile, participation in Public Works would be relatively low and access to Direct Support relatively high. (Such households are typically both poor and without labor power.) There is some supporting evidence. The public works participation rate for the poorest households is lower than it is for wealthier households and the likelihood of getting Direct Support is highest for this decile. However, we would expect that, especially for the wealthier quintiles, coverage rates for public works would be low and this is not the case. For example, 61.3 percent of

households in the third poorest quintile receive public works payments but so do 72.6 percent of the eighth (third richest) decile.

One objection to these descriptive findings is that given that PSNP coverage rates differ by *woreda* and if livestock holdings are higher on some *woredas* than others, then the absence of a declining relationship between participation rates and livestock might be confounded by these location or possibly other confounding effects. To explore this further, we estimate a probit regression where the dependent variable equals one if the household was paid for employment in Public Works, zero if it did not. We model this as a function of characteristics of the household head (sex, age, schooling), wealth (as measured by livestock holdings) and location. We also include whether the household head holds an official position within their village and whether they have a relative holding such a position. Results are shown in Table 4. Note that we express TLU livestock holdings as a quadratic to see if these increase, then decrease the likelihood of PW participation.

** Table 4 about here **

The numbers shown in Table 4 are the marginal effects of these characteristics on the probability that the household participates in public works. For example, the number -0.155 in the first row means the following. After controlling for other household characteristics (age, education of head; wealth; location), a female-headed household is 20.1 percentage points less likely to participate in Public Works than a male-headed household with the same characteristics. This effect is statistically significant. There are two especially noteworthy findings.

First, it is the case that participation in Public Works first increases then decreases with TLU –the marginal effect of the linear term is positive and the

marginal effect of the quadratic terms is negative. However, the size of these effects is small. For example, the marginal effects reported in Table 4 imply that moving from a household with 10 TLU to a household with 20 TLU, and keeping all other characteristics the same, increases the likelihood of participation in PW by 0.5 percentage points. Moving from a household with 10 TLU to a household with 50 TLU, and keeping all other characteristics the same, decreases the likelihood of participation in PW but only by 0.1 percentage points. Second, again taking into account characteristics like wealth, location and sex, age and education of head, households where the head holds an official position in the *kebele* is *more* likely to receive public works payments. The magnitude of these effects is sizeable; being an official raises the probability of getting paid employment for public works by 14.3 percentage points.

The second column of Table 4 repeats this analysis but sets the dependent variable equal to one if the household received Direct Support payments, zero if it did not. Here, we only include a linear term for wealth reflecting our assumption that access to Direct Support should fall as household wealth rises. It shows that the likelihood of receiving Direct Support is higher for female-headed households and increases with the age of the household head. These effect sizes are reasonably large. A female-headed household is 6.5 percentage points more likely to get Direct Support than a male-headed household with the same characteristics. However, increasing wealth levels do not affect the probability of being a Direct Support beneficiary.

One way of thinking about these results is that they imply errors of inclusion - wealthy households receiving public works payments - and errors of exclusion - for

example, from Figure 5b, we see that only 13.2 per cent of households in the poorest wealth quintile received Direct Support.

** Table 5 about here **

As noted in the description of the PSNP, it should be possible for households who perceive that they have been incorrectly excluded to appeal to the *Kebele* Appeals Committee. In practice, as Table 5 shows, focus group discussions with men and women revealed that appeals and complaints were made to a variety of actors. But here too the role of traditional authorities is worth noting. Focus group discussions with WFSTFs revealed their role in appeals management as follows:

> Clan representatives are members of the *Kebele* appeal committee. So, they are playing a key role in resolving cases. [AF-T/W-KI-1]

> Local institutions have a key role. Elders and clan leaders are members of appeal committees at *kebele* and *woreda* levels. For example, three out of five *woreda* appeal committee members are clan leaders and religious elders. [SM-G/W-KI-1]

> If problems happen it is possible to appeal orally or in written. There are individuals called '*Re'ema*' here. In Afar culture, these are individuals believed that they have natural authority to resolve complaints. They rule on various problems and everyone accepts their decisions. [AF-S/FG-4]

The findings presented above – that recipients of the PSNP transfer are frequently not the poorest households in the community and that

targeting of the programme is mediated through local clan-based and authority structures – have serious implications for the anticipated outcomes for the programme. If the programme is to achieve positive change for poor households in these areas then targeting design and structures need to be much more carefully implemented and monitored going forwards. The difficulty lies in balancing externally designed targeting interventions with local political systems of resource distribution. However, this is not a challenge specific to pastoralist regions, it may simply be a challenge exacerbated within these areas; therefore, lessons on increasing effectiveness in targeting can be drawn from other areas and programmes.

(c) Gendered dimensions of program implementation

> Everything having to do with the safety net is dominated by men. [SM-H/FG-3]

The PSNP incorporates design elements to ensure that the interests and voices of women are considered and, indirectly, to empower women. Key among these are guidelines on the composition of community committees for targeting and appeals, including representation by women, as well as quotas for women's representation on *woreda* and regional level PSNP administrative structures. The programme incorporates explicit targeting criteria for women, including the provision of direct support to pregnant and lactating mothers, and specific attention to the needs of recently divorced women and those in polygamous households. Requirements for public workfare projects encompass the provision of childcare at public works sites

to support women's participation, as well as work norms tailored to the physical abilities of women (FDRE, 2009).

A common presumption is that pastoral women are disempowered compared to women in agrarian and urban settings. While men do dominate the realm of public debate in many pastoral societies, and women's participation can be muted within formal decision-making structures, pastoral women do exercise power in multiple ways that are often subtle and 'hidden' (Hodgson, 2000; Flintan, 2008, 2010). Furthermore, social norms and attitudes are shifting, though in an uneven way, alongside the economic transition in the lowlands and related changes in livelihoods (Livingstone and Ruhindi, 2012). Women are, generally, the resource managers in pastoral households. As herd sizes have diminished, women have taken up many of the newly important off-range economic activities. While their work burden has increased, in many cases they also control the income and livelihood they generate from these newly important activities (Buchanan-Smith and Lind, 2005). Thus, their authority has expanded alongside their increasing economic activity beyond household livestock production. Yet, the outcomes of economic diversification are far from uniform, and there are important variations between households and across different pastoral societies. The dynamics of diversification and increased sedentarization can be disempowering for women if they involve additional burdens but without associated improvements in their social status and well-being, and if women are simply pushed to take up menial tasks to compensate for the loss of a household's herds (Joekes and Pointing, 1991; Kipuri and Ridgewell, 2008).

(i) Participation in Food Security Task forces and the planning of public works

As specified in the PIM, there is to be at least one representative from women's groups in the KFSTF. In the Highland regions, adherence to this is nearly universal with more than 95 percent having at least one woman on the KFSTF and more than half having two or more. By contrast, 20 per cent of these task forces in Afar and Somali did not have even a single female representative.

One reason why this lack of representation is problematic is that the KFSTF is supposed to play a key role in planning public works activities. As the PIM emphasizes, their role is complemented by the involvement of the wider community during their selection, planning, monitoring and evaluation. Key informant interviews with regional level Public Works focal units and committees indicated an understanding of this important principle. However, focus groups with men and women indicated varying degrees of participation in the selection, implementation, and monitoring of public works projects. Responses to the question, "As men/women do you feel that you have any influence over decisions about which public works to do? Who often decides the type and location of the public works?" produced the following answers:

From men:

Yes, we have a say. We gather and decide what kind of public works we have to do." [SM-D/K-FG-4]

First we participated on public works planning and now we are doing what we have planned. [SM-S/K-FG-4]

Yes we had influence on decisions about which public works activities to do, we participated in the discussions. But, it is the *kebele* who decides. [SM-S/K/FG-3]

From women:

We don't have any role in making such decisions. We just participate in light works and provision of water and food. [AF-T/K-FG-3]

Everything is under the influence of men and no one considers our feelings or reaction to public works projects. [SM-D/K-FG-3]

** Table 6 about here **

This information can be triangulated with data collected in the quantitative household survey. Respondents were asked if they had participated in the selection of public works projects undertaken in their *kebeles*. Responses were obtained in Teru (Afar) and all sampled localities in Somali. Results by *woreda* and disaggregated by sex of head are reported in Table 6. Across the *woredas* for which we have quantitative data, 19 percent of households report participating in the selection of public works. This compares favorably with participation rates in the Highlands which reached a comparable level in 2008, four years after the start of the PSNP. Consistent with the qualitative data, female-headed households are much less likely to have a say in the selection of public works that are undertaken.

It is possible that this lower level of participation reflects other characteristics (age of head, wealth, schooling) that are correlated with female headship. To assess this, we estimate a probit regression where the dependent variable equals one if the household took part in the choosing of public works, zero if it did not. We model this as a function of characteristics of the household head (sex, age, schooling), wealth

(as measured by livestock holdings) and location. We also include whether the household head holds an official position within their village and whether they have a relative holding such a position. Results are shown in Table 7.

** Table 7 about here **

The numbers shown in Table 7 are the marginal effects of these characteristics on the probability that the household participates in the selection of public works. For example, the number -0.155 in the first row means the following. After controlling for other household characteristics (age, education of head; wealth as measured by Tropical; Livestock Units; location), a female-headed household is 15.5 percentage points less likely to participate than a male-headed household with the same characteristics. This effect is statistically significant. Each 10 additional TLU raises the probability of participating in decision making by three percent. When we take this into account – see the results found in column (2) – the impact of livestock wealth becomes slightly smaller as does female headship but both remain statistically significant.

Does this gender-differentiated participation in the selection of public works affect the benefits that these public works projects create? The quantitative household survey included questions on perceptions of benefits. Just over 70 percent of household heads stated that they benefitted from public works, with male heads being more likely than female heads to indicate this for any public works activity (74 percent of male heads; 59 percent of female heads). The percentage of heads saying that they benefitted from specific public works is given in Table 8.

** Table 8 about here **

(ii) Participation in targeting and appeals processes

Women's participation in targeting is limited. While clan leaders play a more important role in targeting in these areas (as discussed above), they do not widely consult women. When women attend targeting meetings, their voices are rarely taken into account.[6]

> We are not as involved in selecting beneficiaries as are men. The village clan leaders often call and discuss with men. On the rare occasion that they'll call us, we do not have the time to meet with them as we have many household responsibilities at home. Water fetching alone takes up much of our time (up to 7 hours a day). [AF-EW/FG-3]
>
> Not much. We don't have that much voice in selecting beneficiaries. We don't have a representative in the KFSTF and Appeals Committee. [AF-T/FG-3]
>
> As I know, no attention was given to us in our *kebele.* Nobody ever listens to us, including when beneficiaries are being selected. We are uneducated people. Who wants us for a discussion? Nobody. [SM-D/FG-3]

In general, men appear more aware of the appeals and complaints process than women. Women reported that they did not feel that they were encouraged to complain and that there were instances where it was perceived that informal appeals processes were biased against women. As Table 5 shows, men's groups reported making appeals to a wide range of actors, both formal and informal. Some women's groups reported that complaints were made to formal bodies (such as the KAC or *kebele* officials) but many indicated that they simply did not complain, in some cases using the phrase "preferring to keep quiet." One women's group noted:

> Nobody encourages us to voice our concerns. In addition, we have a huge work burden that demands much of our time. [AF-EW/FG-3]
>
> No, because the clan elders/clan leaders decide based on their own judgment and this often biases against women. [AF-EW/FG-3]

The overwhelming majority of appeals and complaints are undertaken verbally. On rare occasions, the appeal cases can be presented in writing, if the person who is appealing wants to do so. But given low levels of literacy, assistance is needed for written appeals. Male FGDs indicated that this was not a problem, "Yes, we are required to present our cases in writing. But, the (community-level) Development Agent or other *kebele* structures can help us as need arise." [AF-T/FG-4] By contrast, support for women was largely absent. In focus groups, respondents remarked, "Nobody supports women to appeal." [SM-S/FG-3] "Nobody supports us to forward our cases." [SM-G/FG-3] "No one is here to support to appeal." [AF-T/FG-3] However, in two *woredas* in Somali where women had access to support through a Women's Association, assistance was available. "There is a women's affairs office. We can go to them after appealing to the committee if they do not appropriately respond to our cases. [SM-S/FG-3]

(iii) Female headed households and distribution through polygamous households

The PIM acknowledges the practice of polygamy in the lowland regions of Ethiopia. It indicates that in the case of polygamous households, the household should be treated as the man, one wife and their children, while other co-wives and their children are registered separately as female-headed households. Community focus

groups indicate that, in practice, polygamous households are treated in one of three ways:

(a) Targeting as per the PIM, reported in two *woredas*;

(b) The husband registers with one of the wives and her children while the other wives are excluded (three *woredas*); or

(c) The husband and all his wives and children are registered as one household (five *woredas*).

> The assistance is for the household and in the name of the husband. If he has two wives he will be given accordingly but the two wives are not registered separately. Mainly the women are responsible to collect the assistance. Young children also can be represented by the family and can collect the assistance for the family. [AF-B/FG-4]
>
> Only the husbands get registered. He registers the number of wives (homes) and he will receive for all his wives and children. If for instance a person having one wife gets one sack of grain, a person with two wives will get two sacks of grain. [AF-S/FG-3]
>
> Polygamous households get support based on the size/amount of support available for the community as a whole. If the available support is small they get one container only (50 kg). If the available support is more then there is enough for each wife to receive separately. But in both cases the resource is shared among the different wives. [AF-S/FG-4]
>
> The wives are not the same. Some are poorer than others. Therefore, the poor wife is the one selected. [SM-H/FG-4]

> In most cases, the family unit with the youngest wife is given priority in polygamous households. This is because the husband gives priority to the youngest wife. We locally say, 'half of the husband's brain works because of the youngest wife.' Sometimes the poor wife and her children are given priority during the beneficiary selection. In this case, this family unit is registered as a female-headed household. This situation happens when the woman insists to be considered for the PSNP because her family is poor. [SM-G/FG-3]

Several reasons were suggested for these deviations from the PIM, including administrative convenience, limited program resources and the desire to target these to poorer households, and the influence of male headships in determining how transfers are distributed across a polygamous unit. The consequences, however, are analogous to the roles played by cultural practices around sharing and by informal authority structures in allocating resources across households. Program resources are diluted and/or resources are, or possibly are not, allocated to the poorest sub-units within these polygamous units.

6. CONCLUSIONS

Implementing safety net programmes in pastoral areas is complicated by the nature and extent of distribution in remote lowland areas where pastoralists make their living. In Somali and Afar regions of Ethiopia, PSNP outcomes have been configured through three distributional channels: practices of sharing within mutual support networks, the important role of informal authority structures in targeting and appeals decisions, and gendered dimensions of work, livelihoods and decision-

making. Each of these has implications for the design and delivery of social protection that meets the overriding programme objective of building the assets of chronically food insecure households to a sufficient level that might provide a buffer against downside risks.

The intense pressure to give and support within horizontal networks of the very poor in pastoral areas risks diluting the level of transfers provided to any one household. The risk is compounded by the problem of undercoverage and the response of officials to cover a greater number of chronically food insecure households by reducing the size of transfers. This undermines the program theory of change to build household assets to a sufficient level that they might move into more productive livelihoods. While practices of sharing clearly challenge standard assumptions of household asset accumulation and 'graduation' in the design of productive safety nets, sharing can expand and/or deepen claims to other social support in the future. Greater insights are required into who recipients share with, how much of their transfer they share, and forms of reciprocity and repayment they receive in turn. However, the fact that sharing practices are identified as a 'problem' itself reflects an institutionalized tendency to pre-judge the very difficult decisions confronting chronically food insecure households, who otherwise depend on mutual help networks when safety net assistance is unavailable. Particularly in contexts where program resources are less than the requirements of meeting the needs of the chronically food insecure population, sharing should be anticipated and planned for.

Effective targeting of the most chronically food insecure households is all the more important in situations where undercoverage is a problem, such as in Somali and Afar. Yet, in these areas informal authorities influence decisions on targeting as well as the size of transfers for households. While structures for targeting and appeals have been established, traditional officials often sit on these structures, and their views weigh heavily on targeting decisions. The influence of traditional structures in targeting poses a problem for hypothesized programme outcomes. While the involvement of informal authorities can lead to inclusion errors, we also know that sharing might counter-act this, which would suggest a patronage function of programme transfers. The difficulty lies in balancing externally designed targeting interventions with local political systems of resource distribution. However, this is not a challenge specific to pastoralist regions, it may simply be a challenge exacerbated within these areas.

Finally, gendered norms of participation and distribution are likely to mean that the interests of the most vulnerable are not represented in programme implementation and, at worse, certain categories of the most vulnerable are excluded from distribution and decision making. These patterns while the norm in these areas, seriously undermine the objectives of the program. Thus, we observe that while programme rules dictate that there should be at least one woman on KFSTFs, in 20 percent of the *kebeles* we visited there were no female representatives on these structures. Further, female-headed households are much less likely to have a say in the selection of public works that are undertaken, women in general feel discouraged from appealing decisions or complaining, and there are few if any provisions in most areas to encourage women's participation in public works.

Widespread and worsening poverty and heightened levels of vulnerability in pastoral areas, exemplified by the regional food crisis in the Horn of Africa in 2011-2012, suggest the urgency of extending the provision of social protection to these populations. Yet, the livelihood setting in the Ethiopian lowlands is starkly different from highland areas where the PSNP was first introduced and modified on the basis of early experiences implementing the programme amongst highland populations whose livelihoods are largely agrarian-based. If standard systems are to be introduced in lowland areas then expectations about program outcomes must be based on a realistic assessment of the unique social, political and livelihood characteristics of pastoral settings.

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Table 1: Major livelihood activities, by wealth groups

Region	*Woreda*	Better off	In the middle	Poor	Poorest of the poor
Afar	Buremudaitu	Livestock keeping, irrigated agriculture and trading	Livestock keeping, farming, trading	Trading, charcoal burning, casual labor	Selling fuelwood and charcoal, casual labor
	Dubti	Livestock keeping, irrigated agriculture and trading	Livestock keeping, cultivate small plots	Livestock keeping, cultivate small irrigated plots	Livestock keeping, cultivate small irrigated plots
	Elidar	Livestock keeping	Livestock keeping	Selling fuelwood	
	Ewa	Livestock keeping	Livestock keeping	Livestock production sharing, PSNP	PSNP, petty trading
	Semurobi	Livestock keeping	Livestock keeping	Herding small animals, farming, trading of goats	Customary social support (*zekat*)
	Teru	Livestock keeping	Livestock keeping	Livestock production, casual labor, PSNP, petty trading	Casual labor, herding animals for the better-off, selling fuelwood and water
Somali	Dolo Odo	Livestock keeping, farming	Working on the farms of the better off	Causal labor	
	Gursum	Production of cash crops (*khat*, vegetables, fruits), fattening animals	Farming, petty trading, fattening of animals	Share cropping, casual labor, Petty trading	
	Hudet	Livestock keeping		Farming	
	Shinile	Livestock keeping, farming	Selling fuelwood and charcoal, farming, livestock production	Herding livestock for *Tajir*, begging, selling charcoal	

Source: Qualitative survey.

Table 2: Percentage of households receiving Public Works payments and Direct Support transfers, by *woreda*

Region	*Woreda*	Number Surveyed		PW payments	Direct Support	PW or DS
				(percent)		
Afar	Teru	90		67.8	4.4	72.2
Somali	Shinile	90		83.3	13.2	96.5
	Erer	90		66.7	15.6	82.3
	Afdem	77		40.3	10.4	50.7
	Gursum	90		53.3	5.6	58.9
	Harsin	90		75.6	0.0	75.6
	Filtu	90		44.4	12.2	56.6
	Dolo Odo	89		55.1	9.0	64.1
	Udet	90		71.1	0.0	71.1
	All	796		62.3	10.0	72.3

Source: Quantitative Household survey.

Table 3: Public Works payments

					Mean			
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Region	*Woreda*	Number of households receiving PW	Number of households surveyed	Percentage of households receiving PW payments	Payment (kg of grain)	Household size	Payment per capita	Number of payments
				(percent)	(kg)		(kg)	
Afar	Teru	61	90	67.8	42.9	7.1	6.3	2.5
Somali	Shinile	75	90	83.3	40.4	4.9	8.8	1.9
	Erer	60	90	66.7	60.1	6.2	10.4	2.8
	Afdem	31	77	40.3	178.1	6.6	28.4	6.6
	Gursum	48	90	53.3	73.1	6.2	13.7	2.9
	Harsin	68	90	75.6	19.9	6.4	3.6	1.5
	Filtu	40	90	44.4	75.9	6.9	11.9	3.1
	Dolo Odo	49	89	55.1	43.5	5.7	8.3	2.7
	Udet	64	90	71.1	57.3	6.5	10.2	3.9
	All	496	796	62.3	57.4	6.2	10.1	2.9

Source: Household survey 2010.

Table 4: Correlates of receipt of payments for Public Works and Direct Support

	Public Works	Direct Support
Household head is female	-0.201***	0.065***
	(0.048)	(0.019)
Age of head	-0.002	0.004***
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Head has some formal schooling	-0.016	-0.015**
	(0.010)	(0.006)
Household size	0.027***	-0.009*
	(0.009)	(0.005)
Head has official position	0.143***	0.038
	(0.054)	(0.045)
Relative of head has official position	0.062	0.031
	(0.038)	(0.019)
Livestock holdings (TLU)	0.007**	-0.001
	(0.003)	(0.001)
Livestock holdings (TLU) squared	-0.0002***	
	(0.00005)	
Household lives in: Shinile	0.169**	-0.027
	(0.073)	(0.036)
Erer	-0.169*	0.015
	(0.092)	(0.049)
Afdem	-0.440***	-0.011
	(0.077)	(0.037)
Gursum	-0.339***	-0.023
	(0.090)	(0.035)
Harshin	-0.132	
	(0.093)	
Filtu	-0.392***	0.004
	(0.084)	(0.048)
Dolo Odo	-0.258***	-0.015
	(0.095)	(0.036)
Udet	-0.136	
	(0.094)	
Observations	728	554

Notes: Impact of covariates is expressed in terms of marginal effects. Numbers in parentheses are *kebele* clustered standard errors. * significant at the 10 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; *** significant at the 1 percent level. For DS, Harshin and Udet are excluded as they have no Direct Support beneficiaries.

Table 5: Who appeals to whom?

	Appeals made to:								
Focus group	**KAC**	**KFSTF**	**DA**	***Kebele*** **administra-tor or committee**	***Woreda*** **officials**	**Clan leaders *(Dalla*)**	**Sub-clan leader (*Kedo Aba*)**	**Do not know to whom to complain**	**Do not complain**
Men's group	1	1	0	7	3	3	1	0	1
Women's groups	1	0	1	3	2	0	0	1	6

Source: Qualitative field work

Table 6: Percentage of households participating in the selection of public works, by *woreda* and sex of head

		Percentage participating		
Region	**Woreda**	**All households**	**Male-headed**	**Female-headed**
Afar	Teru	11.1	12.5	0.0
Somali	Shinile	28.9	36.7	13.3
	Erer	28.9	30.7	20.0
	Afdem	9.1	14.0	0.0
	Gursum	5.6	6.9	0.0
	Harshin	40.0	42.9	0.0
	Filtu	6.7	9.4	0.0
	Dolo Odo	11.2	15.4	0.0
	Udet	27.8	30.4	23.5
	Total	18.9	22.3	8.1

Source: Quantitative household survey.

Table 7: Correlates of household participation in the selection of public works

	(1)	(2)
Household head is female	-0.155***	-0.122***
	(0.039)	(0.038)
Age of head	0.013**	0.010*
	(0.006)	(0.006)
Age of head squared	-0.000**	-0.000*
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Head has some formal schooling	0.008	0.004
	(0.009)	(0.009)
Head speaks Amharic	0.032	-0.010
	(0.059)	(0.054)
Head has official position		0.286***
		(0.064)
Relative of head has official position		0.041
		(0.036)
Livestock holdings (TLU)	0.003***	0.002*
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Household lives in: Shinile	0.336**	0.240
	(0.155)	(0.150)
Erer	0.209	0.136
	(0.143)	(0.137)
Afdem	-0.028	-0.043
	(0.063)	(0.065)
Gursum	-0.047	-0.079
	(0.102)	(0.081)
Harshin	0.314	0.285
	(0.211)	(0.206)
Filtu	-0.075	-0.104***
	(0.048)	(0.039)
Dolo Odo	0.022	-0.022
	(0.077)	(0.075)
Udet	0.265**	0.175*
	(0.114)	(0.101)
Observations	727	722

Notes: Impact of covariates is expressed in terms of marginal effects. Numbers in parentheses are kebele clustered standard errors. * significant at the 10 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; *** significant at the 1 percent level.

Table 8: Household perceptions of whether they benefitted from public works

	Male			Female			All	
	Percent who say they benefit from:	**Sample size**		**Percent who say they benefit from:**	**Sample size**		**Percent who say they benefit from:**	**Sample size**
	(percent)			(percent)			(percent)	
Road	72.8	441		52.3	109		68.7	550
Water harvesting	82.2	45		37.5	8		75.5	53
SWC, communal land	62.4	101		79.3	29		66.2	130
Other NRM	65.5	29		76.5	17		69.6	46
Schools	71.0	131		55.2	29		68.1	160
Health posts	82.6	23		62.5	8		77.4	31
Wells	74.4	43		41.7	12		67.3	55
Other	75.5	286		61.0	77		72.5	363
Any public works activity	73.7	555		59.3	150		70.6	705

Source: Quantitative household survey.

Figure 1a: Mean livestock holding (TLU), by TLU decile, Afar



Source: Household survey

Figure 1b: Distribution of livestock holdings, by TLU decile, Afar



Source: Household survey

Figure 2a: Mean livestock holding (TLU), by TLU decile, Somali



Source: Household survey.

Figure 2b: Distribution of livestock holdings, by TLU decile, Somali



Source: Household survey.

Figure 3: Total grain payments, by household size and *woreda*



Udet *woreda*



Figure 4: Scattergram of coverage and per capita transfers



Figure 5a Relationship between livestock holdings, deciles of TLU, and participation in Public Works



Figure 5b Relationship between livestock holdings, deciles of TLU, and receipt of Direct Support payments



Endnotes

[1] For definitions of "pastoralists" and "agro-pastoralists", see Swift (1988), Heffernan (2004) and Rass (2006).

[2] For a nascent literature on social protection in pastoral and agro-pastoral contexts, see Benhke et al. (2007), Ali and Hobson (2009), Burns et al. (2010), Devereux and Tibbo (2012).

[3] A *woreda* is equivalent to a county or district. *Woredas* are typically divided into 10-15 *kebeles*.

[4] Coding of quotations works as follows. S and A signify Somali and Afar respectively. The -_ refers to the location of the interview within the region. FG refers to a focus group and KI to a key informant.

[5] Figure 1 only includes mean values where there are at least five observations for a given household size in each *woreda*.

[6] There were exceptions to this. A woman in a focus group in Shinile stated: "We are heard and we are members of the community. Yes we have expressed our opinions in different occasions. I'm the head of a family and I told them that I cannot work. I have small children so I am allowed free food. We all expressed our views. There are individuals who were included in the safety net on the basis of women's suggestions." [SM-S/FG-3]