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Jonah Leff, Monterey Institute of International Studies, United States

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The majority of those living in the border region of Kenya, Sudan, and Uganda are pastoralists, whose livelihoods are dictated by the upkeep and size of their herds. Harsh environmental conditions force pastoralists to migrate in search of water and pasturelands during the dry season. With limited access to water and competing rights to land, inter-tribal conflict arises when pastoralists from one tribe enter the territory of another. The increased availability of small arms in the region from past wars increasingly makes ordinary clashes fatal. Governments in the region have responded with heavy-handed coercive disarmament operations. These have led to distrust and subsequent violent clashes between communities and security providers. This report reviews the scale, consequences of, and responses to the many pastoral conflicts, utilizing methodological tools such as key informant interviews, retrospective analysis, and a thorough review of available literature.

Map 1

Source: Small Arms Survey 2007.

1. Introduction

The border lands connecting Kenya, Sudan, and Uganda form a large portion of the East Africa drylands. The pastoral ethnic groups living in this part of the continent—northern Uganda, northwestern Kenya, southeastern Sudan, and southwestern Ethiopia—share a common language, culture, and geographical location. The majority of those living in this arid and semi-arid area are pastoralists, whose social and economic life is structured around the maintenance and well-being of their livestock. For pastoralists, livestock serves as the primary asset and source of sustenance (Jacobs 1965; Silberman 1959). Their way of life has been dictated by severe weather patterns characterized by a climate where temperatures often exceed 40 degrees centigrade with little annual rainfall (Mburu 1999). During the dry season or times of drought, pastoralists are forced to relocate their cattle in search of water and pasturelands for grazing. Temporary cattle camps, or "kraals,"[1] are assembled to keep livestock from wandering off and to protect them from potential raids by neighboring tribes.

Jonah Leff is currently a member of the UN Panel of Experts on the Sudan, monitoring and reporting on the UN arms embargo in Darfur.

1 "Kraal" is an African word for a roughly circular fenced enclosure for cattle or other livestock, located within a homestead or village.

With limited access to water and competing rights to land, inter-tribal conflict arises when pastoralists from one tribe enter the territory of another. This phenomenon occurs among tribes within borders as well as with those across the border in neighboring countries. The pastoralist conflict has remained low-profile (if visible at all), against a backdrop of insurgencies and wars that have afflicted the region. Conventional wisdom has underestimated the direct and indirect impacts of pastoralist conflict, in many cases writing it off as a primitive cultural practice. The spillover effects of wars in southern Sudan and Uganda—including the proliferation of high-powered assault rifles—have transformed otherwise low-intensity tensions into full-scale massacres (Mburu 1999). These pastoral clashes go largely under-reported.

This report reviews the scale, consequences of, and responses to the many pastoral conflicts in Sudan, Uganda, and Kenya. Inter-tribal clashes frequently erupt among the Turkana and Pokot (Kenya), Toposa (Sudan), and Karimojong (Uganda) (see map 2). At one time managed locally through customary mechanisms, these conflicts are increasingly fatal. The consequences are far-reaching: ranging from widespread fatalities (including women and children), protracted displacement of families, and severe depletion of livestock. State responses in Uganda, Kenya, and Sudan have typically been coercive and repressive, a function of comparatively deeply-rooted repressive attitudes toward non-sedentary populations. It is vital that international and domestic actors recognize the dynamics of these pastoral conflicts if arms control and disarmament activities are to generate meaningful outcomes for human security.

Map 2



Source: Small Arms Survey 2007.

2. Methodology

The methodologies employed in this study use multiple tools, which were designed to triangulate with one another for maximum data reliability. They include the following:

2.1. Key Informant Interviews

Key informant interviews were conducted in Eastern Equatoria (Sudan) and in the Lokichoggio and Oropoi divisions of northern Kenya. The interview questions were mostly open-ended, allowing the respondent to give anecdotal evidence to support his/her opinions. Interviews were conducted with a variety of actors, including government and military officials, CBO representatives, UN officials, chiefs, and elders.

2.2. Retrospective Analysis

Lexis Nexis was used to construct a timeline of news articles that describe violent events that have occurred throughout the pastoralist region. By accumulating news articles from the region, it is possible to gain a nuanced view of violent events. In addition, articles were used to map patterns of violence as well as community and governmental responses to such events. These articles were also used to fact-check the information gleaned through key informant interviews.

3. Pastoral Conflict: An Escalating Problem

Pastoralists make up a considerable proportion of the population of the Greater Horn of Africa, and are the dominant grouping within the Kenya-Sudan-Uganda border region. These pastoralists face a harsh existence with cattle rearing, migration, and self-defense forming the basic cornerstones of their livelihoods. Conflicts over common resources are instituted features of inter- and intra-communal relations. But the influence of past wars—including an abundance of high-powered assault rifles—has intensified what were once minor clashes. The commercialized trade in small arms, controlled in part by local elites, has intensified the conflict, leading to widespread indiscriminate fatalities (mostly women and children), displacement of families, and depletion of livestock (Mkutu 2003; Osamba 2000). A 2008 Small Arms Survey study in Eastern Equatoria State (Sudan) and Turkana North (Kenya) reveals that nearly half of all respondents (45.7 per cent, n=238, N=521) had witnessed a violent event in their lifetime (McEvoy and Murray 2008).[2] Moreover, between 1994 and 2005, pastoralist districts in Uganda and Kenya lost an estimated 460,000 livestock, worth over US$75 million, and as of 2003, a total of 164,457 people had been displaced by conflict in northern Kenya (Pkalya, Adan, and Masinde 2003). Similar patterns are prevalent among pastoralist communities in neighboring countries.

Violent confrontations involving the Toposa of Southern Sudan and Turkana of Northern Kenya are reported weekly.[3] In 2004, just a few kilometers from Narus, Sudan, a group of over one hundred Turkana warriors from Kenya crossed the border to attack a Toposa kraal on the outskirts of Narus. In the clash, over thirty people were reported killed, and more than one hundred cattle, worth over US$22,000, were stolen. The government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) compensated the families with livestock after efforts to settle with the Kenyan authorities failed.[4] Between 2004 and 2008, local peace deals reduced the frequency and intensity of tribal raids. In May 2008, however, Taposa raiders crossed into the Lokichoggio Division of northern Kenya, resulting in an estimated forty-three deaths, the majority Taposa (McEvoy and Murray 2008).

Likewise, in May 2007, 54 people were reported killed and 11 injured when Toposa tribesmen attacked Didinga villagers while they were cultivating their crops, just outside of Kapoeta, Sudan. Among the 54 victims, 48 were women and children. Sources claim that this was a well-coordinated attack and involved heavy and general-purpose machine guns, RPGs, 60mm mortars, and AKM assault rifles. In addition to the killings, the Toposa made away with a total of 800 cattle and goats.[5] In response, Michael Losike Lokeruia, a Toposa member of the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly called for simultaneous disarmament in Eastern Equatoria, but cautioned that such an initiative would only be successful if neighboring communities in Kenya and Uganda were disarmed as well (*Sudan Tribune*, July 23, 2007).

Research conducted in Eastern Equatoria suggests that armed violence of this magnitude is commonplace,[6] but with limited media attention to the region, combined with poor communications infrastructure, even large events such as this may well go unreported. Clearly, pastoral conflict is not limited exclusively to border areas. It is common among neighboring tribes within Sudan as well as in neighboring countries. Although UNMIS peacekeepers are present in Southern Sudan, their deployment to Eastern Equatoria is limited to Torit. Moreover, their mandate is only to "protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence" in the context of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement rather than disarming them (UNMIS 2005). With the near absence of state-led security providers, most pastoral communities have little-to-no protection against the threat of violence.

2 A total of 324 questionnaires were administered in the following counties in Sudan: Ikotos, Kapoeta East, Kapoeta North, Kapoeta South, Lafon, and Torit. A total of 194 questionnaires were administered in the following divisions in Kenya: Lokichoggio and Oropoi.

3 Discussions with local leaders in Eastern Equatoria (Sudan) and Lokichoggio Division (Kenya) in May/June 2007.

4 Interview with Albert Locheria, Coordinator of the Kapoeta East Native Development Association (KENDA), June 4, 2007.

5 E-mail correspondence with UNMIS official, July 13, 2007.

6 Interviews in Sudan May/June 2007.

4. Factors Contributing to the Conflict

4.1. Environmental Factors

Unfavorable climatic conditions play a critical role and often precipitate the need for pastoralists to migrate in search of pasturelands and water. During the dry season, sources of water become desiccated and lands turn arid. This forces young pastoralists to leave villages with their livestock in search of water and grazing lands. It is during these times that pastoralists engage in conflict over herding territory and replenishment of lost cattle. When conditions are made worse by extended periods of drought, conflicts become more intensified and frequent.

In the past few decades, drought-related emergencies have risen sharply. Oxfam (2006), for instance, reports that from 1975 to 2006 the number of people affected by drought rose from 16,000 to an estimated three million. This calculation does not take into account that the population has also grown significantly, but not nearly as exponentially as those impacted by the recurrent droughts. The Turkana have been faced with a persistent drought problem since 1999. They call this event "Kichutanak," which means "it has swept away everything, even animals." In some areas of Turkana District, 70 percent of people's livestock were lost. In financial terms, this is equivalent to losing 70 percent of one's savings. Not surprisingly, prolonged drought and the cattle deaths associated with it brought escalating levels of violence in the region.

In March 2006, over 600 Turkana families from Oropoi village, Kenya, left their homes and crossed the border into Uganda with their livestock in search of water. This became their only option when the sole water pump within a radius of 50 km dried up (*Africa News*, March 28, 2006). Inevitably, the neighboring Dodoth tribe in northern Uganda attacked the fleeing Turkana.

In the past, pastoralists had strategies for coping with the impacts of drought. However, more severe weather patterns resulting from climate change, coupled with colonial and post-colonial policies that constrain the movement of pastoralists, makes inter- and intra-tribal rivalries more commonplace.

4.2. Colonial and Post-Colonial Policies

Cattle raiding among pastoralists is a phenomenon that stretches back centuries. Traditionally, cattle rustling, often involving some violence, was redistributive and only involved the theft of cattle to replenish herds after death from drought or to pay out as bride price. When tribe members were killed, cattle were offered as compensation and the culprits were subjected to intense cleansing rituals. Prior to the system of hierarchical government, councils of elders, traditional courts, and peer groups were at the center of authority among tribes. As such, they governed raids to ensure that they did not spiral out of control, and when disputes arose, traditional mechanisms were employed to settle them (Mkutu 2003). Typically, there was some loss of life from raiding, but on a much smaller scale.

Colonial rulers disrupted the pastoralist social order, replacing it with a system of provincial government appointees within newly established borders that limited the free movement of pastoralists. Traditionally, land belonging to families was passed down from one generation to the next, but alienation of pastoralists from their land, combined with discriminatory land reforms eroded this custom (Kandagor 2005). In addition, pastoral communities were isolated from other areas that enjoyed the benefits of colonial security and development (Mburu 1999). The apparent crackdown on cattle raiding is emblematic of an overall attack on pastoralism itself, on the grounds that it was a primitive and thus inhumane way of life. The weakening of traditional governance has undermined pastoralists' authority and ability to settle disputes. Without adequate alternatives to replace traditional structures of governance and security, pastoralists operate in an anarchic environment (Mkutu 2003).

7 http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/issues/climate_change/story_turkana.htm.

8 It is pastoralist tradition for the groom to present a number of animals to the family of the bride. The number of livestock given to the bride's family depends on the economic status of the groom's family. Wealthy families give dowries of up to 300 animals worth roughly US$25,000. Many young warriors will raid cattle camps in order to provide large numbers of cattle to their bride. As cattle has increasingly become a commercial commodity, brides and their families have begun to put large demands on bride-price. Information from interviews with chiefs from Lokichoggio, Kenya, on June 1, 2007

Today, with a colonial attitude that has persisted in the post-colonial era,[9] the spread of land privatization, and government policies favoring sedentary groups and large-scale agriculture over nomadic livelihoods, competition over grazing areas has grown increasingly fierce. Pastoralists are also heavily underrepresented in parliament and civil service posts. Furthermore, Duffield argues that neo-liberal policies that embrace a market economy polarize rich and poor, resulting in a new generation of youth that disregard the authority of elders by obtaining wealth through militia formation and banditry (1997). Local business and political elites use cattle rustling as a means for commercial profit, capitalizing on the breakdown of traditional lines of authority.

4.3. Commercialization of Cattle Raiding

The emergence of local elites that aim to profit from cattle rustling is a fairly new phenomenon that has changed the scope of the conflict by creating economic incentives that did not previously exist. This has exacerbated the brutality associated with raiding and has created links between the illicit trades in stolen cattle and small arms. Mkutu writes that commercialization in cattle rustling is "leading to major changes in economic, social and political structures in the border area" (2003). Local businessmen and even politicians reportedly fund raids in order to sell cattle on the black market to places as far away as South Africa and Saudi Arabia (Mkutu 2003). Stolen cattle are also used to supply large towns, which have grown in population through rural-to-urban migration. Whereas small-scale raiding does not deplete entire stocks, commercialized raids with elaborate planning and logistical know-how can render entire communities destitute. Buchanan-Smith and Lind (2005) suggest that there are typically five large raids in Southern Turkana in a given year. Large infrequent raids, coupled with repeated small-scale incidents create an environment of insecurity and financial hardship.

The commercialization of cattle raiding has had devastating effects on the pastoralist economy. Whereas cattle traditionally circulated within the pastoralist region, they are now being sold outside without any revenue to speak of. In many instances, warriors conducting large commercial raids outnumber security forces. There is also evidence that many local security providers are in collusion with the profiteers of raids (Mkutu 2003). The lack of state control in the pastoralist region has made way for, what Osamba calls "the emergence of cattle warlords with armed militia" (2000). Without proper security provision, a small number of entrepreneurs will continue to benefit at the expense of a great number of people.

4.4. Lack of State Security Provision

As part of a political campaign that favors sedentary communities over non-sedentary groups, governments have neglected to invest a great deal in infrastructure and public services in the pastoralist border areas, thus exacerbating the lack of state security in the region. Without sufficient roads, accessible lines of communication, and a large qualified security presence, pastoralists have had no choice but to take up arms in order to protect their families and livestock. Moreover, cross-border raiders are immune from prosecution, because governments lack the capacity or infrastructure required to prosecute those involved in acts taking place in other jurisdictions.[10] The Small Arms Survey reports that nearly 60 percent of residents living along the Kenya-Sudan border are dissatisfied with security provisions in their communities (McEvoy and Murray 2008).

In Kenya and Uganda, where the military's role is restricted to responding to large-scale incidents and carrying out community disarmament programs, governments have armed local defense units to provide security at the local level. These comprise civilians who are given a registered firearm and ammunition without any training or remuneration. In Kenya, for instance, the Kenyan Police Reservists (KPR), armed with Kalashnikov-pattern and G3 assault rifles, function as a community task force mandated to respond to local crime and disputes. While the KPR are

9 The policies, first implemented during the colonial era, that viewed nomadic culture as backward and primitive have persisted. The Kenyan government has continued to marginalize pastoralist communities by limiting their rights to land and through under-representation in government (Mkutu 2003, 2006).

10 Confidential interviews conducted in Sudan in May/June 2007.

sometimes effective in defending communities against cattle raids, they are known to lend out their weapons to warriors for raiding purposes, undermining the very security they are supposed to protect. Moreover, a 2008 ammunition study in Kenya found that the majority of illicit civilian-held ammunition was Kenyan-manufactured, revealing that it had either been stolen from weakly guarded stockpiles or sold by corrupt officials (Bevan 2008a).

The Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in Southern Sudan has also been accused of corruption and poor response to violent incidents. There is a growing police force in Southern Sudan, but it lacks training, is poorly funded, and due to insufficient transportation and communications, cannot respond in time to violent events.[12] Between the border town of Nadapal (Sudan) and Lokichoggio (Kenya), a disputed 25-kilometer road connects the two countries. Without any security posts on the road, Turkana warriors from the hills are able to ambush the many cars that travel up and down this road daily. The SPLA Commander of Nadapal confirmed that banditry on the border road results in fatalities on a weekly basis.[13]

Deficits in the government security sector are compounded by the common practice of governments and security forces arming paramilitary groups for political advantage against opponents, notably in Uganda and Sudan. This, among other things, sustains the circulation and widespread availability of small arms.

4.5. Proliferation of Small Arms

Pastoralists living in the border region provide a large market for small arms. Traditionally, pastoralists practiced cattle rustling using bows and arrows. Today, with the availability of cheap and easy-to-use high-powered assault rifles, namely the AK-47, the conflict has taken on epidemic proportions with increased fatalities and indiscriminate killing during raids. A 2008 study in Karamoja, Uganda, found that 88 percent of respondents recalled a small arm being used in the last violent attack on their community (see figure 1) (Bevan 2008b). Likewise, the Small Arms Survey suggests that small arms are used in 96.9 per cent of cattle rustling events in the Kenya-Sudan border region (McEvoy and Murray 2008). While it is difficult to estimate the exact number of small arms in circulation in the region, experts estimate that it is well over 300,000 (Regional Program of Action for Peace and Security 2006). Pastoralist communities arm themselves for several reasons. First, they need to protect their family and livestock from warriors of other tribes and bandits. Second, guns are used to raid livestock from other communities. Lastly, guns are an investment that can be traded for livestock and other commercial goods.[14]

Small arms have been present throughout the region since the early twentieth century. However, past wars in Uganda, Sudan, and Ethiopia left a surplus of weapons in circulation. One event, in particular, that is often recalled is the 1979 raid on the Moroto arms depot in Uganda, following the collapse of the Idi Amin regime. The Matheniko Karimojong sub-clan were successful in acquiring large quantities of weapons and ammunition during the raid (Mkutu 2007). A similar event took place in Kapoeta, Southern Sudan, in 2002, during the North-South war. After the SPLA captured Kapoeta, which at the time was a military stronghold of the north, security at arms stores was lax or non-existent, and as a result, Taposa tribesmen (who live around Kapoeta) were able to seize thousands of weapons (Bevan 2008a).[15] Compounding the situation, the SPLA laid off several hundred troops after the war, offering them small arms as part of their retirement package. Not surprisingly, many of the officers sold them to gun markets in Sudan, Uganda, and Kenya (Mkutu 2006).

Furthermore, it is widely believed that the government of Sudan in Khartoum provides arms to pastoralist communities in the South in order to destabilize the government of Southern Sudan's power base, and to challenge the authority of the SPLA.[16] These weapons inevitably leak out of communities into the greater arms trade routes of the region. Events

11 Confidential interview with a knowledgeable source, Lokichoggio, Kenya, June 1, 2007.

12 Interviews with SPLA Commander of Nadapal, Sudan, June 4, 2007, and Alphonse Irenge, Senior Inspector Local Government, Narus, Sudan, June 5, 2007.

13 Interview with SPLA Commander of Nadapal, Sudan, June 4, 2007.

14 Interviews in Kenya and Sudan in May/June 2007.

15 Confidential interviews conducted in Sudan in May/June 2007.

16 Interview with Marko Lokorae, Commissioner of Kapoeta East County, Sudan, June 5, 2007.

of this magnitude along with smaller raids of insecure stockpiles and sales from corrupt officials have contributed remarkably to the proliferation of small arms in the region.

Map 3: Cross-Border Arms Flows



Source: Mkutu 2003.

Mkutu reports there are four main trade routes for small arms in the border region (2006, see map 3). The primary route, he believes, is from Southern Sudan to the Karamoja region of Uganda. From Kotido district arms are trafficked into Pokot and Samburu districts of Kenya. Others are taken south to Moroto and Nakapiripirit districts in Uganda. The second is the "north-eastern route" into Kenya from Somalia. From Somalia, these arms move through the Merille area of Ethiopia and on to the Karamoja region in Uganda. From there, they move east into the Pokot and Turkana areas of Kenya. Due to the many areas of transit, this route is very costly. It is also believed that arms come in from Somalia from the south, but according to the local Turkana, most of these weapons are dropped off to Somali arms dealers to be sold in Nairobi, Kenya.[17] The third route flows from Southern Sudan into Lokichoggio, Kenya. It is estimated that roughly 11,000 guns per year make their way over the border along this trade route (IGAD 2004). The Turkana take some of these arms into Uganda for resale. The fourth route is the Karenga-Lopoch-Kotido direction. This is the primary route for providing the sub-clans of the Karimojong with weapons. The Jie tribe is said to be the principle supplier of small arms to other groups of the Karimojong, and possibly the Turkana in Kenya (Mkutu 2006).

Over the past few decades, the price of small arms has dropped dramatically. During the 1990s, an AK-47 cost between 20 and 30 cows (US$3,000–3,500) (Mkutu 2006). Today, an AK-47 sells for as little as three cows (US$300–350). Conversely, ammunition, which used to be sold by the bucket, has increased in price. This leaves one to wonder why the price of small arms has not increased following the many aggressive state-led disarmament initiatives. The decrease in weapons after disarmament should have caused a price rise unless demand also decreased. Due to the resistance and conflict that has resulted from disarmament programs in the region, it is quite unlikely that this phenomenon can be explained by a decrease in demand. One reasonable explanation is that the excess in weapons carried into the region by military forces has contributed to the overall number in circulation. Soldiers who are dissatisfied or looking for extra cash may sell the weapons they collect back into the civilian population. This type of corruption among security providers undermines the effectiveness and legitimacy of disarmament campaigns.

5. Implications of Disarmament

The internationally prescribed and favored course of action for governments in response to conflict of this nature has been civilian disarmament programs. Particularly in the Horn of Africa, where pastoralists have been marginalized and perceived as continuing a historical conflict based on backward customs and ideals, governments have implemented heavy-handed coercive disarmament programs.[19] Such crackdown operations often intensify insecurity for disarmed groups, in some cases prompting raids from neighboring tribes who seek to take advantage of their neighbors' temporary weakness.

17 Confidential interviews conducted in Kenya in May/June 2007.

18 Interviews with local leaders in Kenya and Sudan in May/June 2007.

19 Coercive disarmament is often pursued as part of crime reduction, peacekeeping, or peace support operations. It is usually conducted exclusively by security structures, and carries the threat of punitive measures for non-compliance.

5.1. Disarmament in Karamoja, Uganda

Uganda has long experimented with coercive disarmament of its pastoral populations, particularly in the Karamoja region. At least eight disarmament campaigns have been undertaken since 1945. More recent campaigns in 2001 and 2002 led to the recovery of at least 10,000 weapons, though many (8,000) were subsequently re-issued to warriors who were recruited into Local Defense Units and Anti-Stock-Theft coalitions (Uganda 2005). By 2006, many of the latter were considered obsolete, with a great deal of their weapons and ammunition in circulation. Beginning in April 2006, the Uganda People's Defense Force (UPDF) launched aggressive "cordon and search" disarmament interventions. Preliminary assessments suggest that these activities generated widespread distrust and fear among the local population and a concomitant increase in demand for weapons (Bevan 2008b).

The UPDF adopted a heavy-handed approach to disarmament in 2006 and 2007. Forces used mounted machine guns, assault rifles, and grenades against civilians during offensives in the Karamoja region. The casualties included many (unarmed) women and children. Predictably, anti-government/UPDF sentiments flared amongst the Karimojong, resulting in a number of reprisal attacks. For example, in mid-October 2006 during retaliation against cordon and search operations launched near Kotido town, Jie warriors shot dead 16 soldiers including the commanding officer of the UPDF 67th battalion (Bevan 2008b). Moreover, UPDF-initiated disarmament campaigns leave Karamoja communities vulnerable to raids from tribal groups in other areas of Uganda, Kenya and Sudan. Unable to defend themselves, the Karimojong are rapidly rearming.

5.2. Disarmament in the North Rift Region of Kenya

The government of Kenya also launched a series of military-led disarmament programs in seven districts of the North Rift region in mid-2006. The process proceeded in three phases: (1) Operation *Dumisha Amani* (maintain peace), a voluntary weapons collection that promised increased security and amnesty from prosecution, where no force was used; (2) Operation *Okota I* (collect 1), a forceful disarmament of communities that had not cooperated with phase one of the program; and (3) *Okota II* (collect 2), a development component designed to improve economic conditions in previously armed areas so as to reduce incentives for arms possession (Riam Riam 2007).
The disarmament campaign returned approximately 1,710 firearms and 5,700 rounds of ammunition from Turkana District. Disarmament, however, came at a price, especially for those in Turkana South, where neighboring tribes repeatedly attacked disarmed communities (Riam Riam 2007). During the exercise, the Pokot of Turkana South were able to flee into Uganda to avoid having their weapons confiscated. The Turkana, on the other hand, were unable to relocate, which left them exposed to returning Pokot warriors from Uganda. Allegations also surfaced that a number of Kenyan military personnel tortured and abused civilians when they refused to voluntarily surrender their weapons or divulge information concerning armed community members.[20]

Although well intentioned, the program lacked clear objectives and genuine consent from community leaders and populations. The campaign was rushed and failed to sensitize participants. Furthermore, civilian populations rapidly lost confidence when they discovered that they were not going to be compensated for their surrendered weapons. Pastoral populations, long used to repressive interventions from the state, interpreted the disarmament process as yet another offensive intended to undermine their overall development and freedom of movement.

When the news from Turkana South reached Turkana North, chiefs and community leaders requested that the government conduct disarmament on a voluntary basis. As an alternative to giving up their arms, weapon holders were recruited as KPR, exchanging their weapons for registered government-issued ones.[21] This unorthodox approach to

20 Phone interview with Alex Losikiria, Coordinator of APEDI, July 3, 2007, and phone interview with John Mark Edaan, Coordinator of Riam Riam, July 5, 2007.

21 Phone interview with Alex Losikiria, Coordinator of APEDI, July 3, 2007.

disarmament maintained security without damaging civilian and military relations. This method, however, does not address the negative implications of arming untrained and unpaid civilians, as discussed above.

Disarmament Gone Wrong in Jonglei State, Sudan

South Sudan has also experienced disarmament with mixed results. Between December 2005 and May 2006, the SPLA conducted a disarmament campaign in northern Jonglei State, Sudan. This initiative faced resistance from the Lou Nuer faction of the White Army (a loosely organized collection of armed young men that received arms from the Khartoum government in the north, and from local tribes in the area).[22] In terms of weapons collected, the northern Jonglei disarmament initiative was a success, with estimates of weapons collected ranging between 3,300 and 3,701. However, the human costs associated with this program were remarkably high. By the time it was over, the campaign resulted in an estimated 1,200 White Army and 400 SPLA soldier deaths—approximately one death for every two weapons seized. Officials reported over 213 civilian deaths as well as looting and burning of houses in roughly 15 villages suspected of hosting cadres of resistance (Small Arms Survey 2006). The Jonglei exercise, ad hoc in nature, was poorly planned and lacked buy-in from local chiefs and community members. Disguised as civilian disarmament, the operation was politically motivated and aimed at crushing dissent. Finally, in February 2007, in response to previously failed efforts, the GoSS produced principles and guidelines for future initiatives (GoSS 2007). However, despite these developments, there is no institution mandated to oversee civilian disarmament in South Sudan.

Although disarmament was not fully realized, the perception among White Army members was that they were weakened, in an insecure environment, with fewer guns to protect their villages. While many subsequently joined the SPLA, those who chose not to found themselves living in fear of attack by rival Murle and Dinka tribesmen who remained armed. Although the SPLA promised buffer zones to protect disarmed communities, these never materialized. Following the campaign, it has become extremely difficult to purchase guns due to the harsh punishment attached to arms sales and possession. While this may, at first glance, appear to be a positive byproduct of the disarmament program, it ultimately undermined the ability of villagers to guard against the threat of raids from neighboring tribes (Garfield 2007).

A range of disarmament efforts continue in Jonglei State. A UN-backed campaign in Akobo yielded an estimated 1,400 rifles, machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, and mortars from Murle militia by July 2006. Most recently, UNMIS supported a voluntary disarmament campaign in Pibor County, targeting the Murle tribe, which ended in May 2007. Approximately 1,126 weapons and 79 rounds of ammunition were collected. The surprisingly small amount of ammunition collected raises the possibility that civilians remain in possession of arms for which they require ammunition. Disarmament efforts were later expanded to Boma, an isolated region of Pibor County, but temporarily postponed owing to the onset of the rainy season and the lack of security provision by the SPLA.[24]

22 Members of the White Army are dispersed throughout several communities, and act as defense forces at the local level, but sometimes team up for particular causes.

23 There is suspicion, however, that many of these armed youth that had fled during the dry season have returned to villages with the start of the wet season.

24 E-mail correspondence with UNMIS official, July 13, 2007.

The poorly planned coercive measures applied in Jonglei, Karamoja, and Turkana are indicative of the neglectful attitude of governments toward the pastoralist regions. It is clear from these cases that disarmament schemes that ignore the root causes of demand for small arms, while simultaneously putting communities on the defensive without proper state-led security provision may result in an array of unintended consequences. A 2008 Small Arms Survey report from the Sudan-Kenya border region reports that more than 60 percent of respondents believe that civilian disarmament would decrease security in their villages (McEvoy and Murray 2008). When locals were asked how disarmament in Jonglei and Turkana South affected the security of those areas, the majority of respondents claimed that it had decreased security. Not surprisingly, when asked how a potential disarmament program in the community would change the level of security, most said it would decrease security a lot.

Whereas civilian disarmament has yielded mixed results, a number of local conflict resolution initiatives have brought some hope to the situation.

6. Alternative Conflict Resolution Mechanisms

The effectiveness of coercive disarmament is open to dispute. Few evidence-based studies have been undertaken to assess the extent to which such interventions yield comparatively high weapons returns or meaningful improvements in safety and security. There is, however, a growing body of evidence demonstrating that more modest initiatives advanced by credible civil society organizations (CSO) are delivering encouraging returns with fewer human costs.

A number of CSOs are currently conducting cross-border conflict prevention and mediation interventions aimed at improving communication through peacebuilding workshops and negotiating the safe return of cattle. These CSOs attempt to reinstate and utilize traditional lines of authority that have been weakened since the colonial era.[26] In other words, village elders, who once oversaw the practice of raiding, play a central role, and are given authority throughout the mitigation process. These initiatives, coupled with a more robust and better-trained state security presence may be the catalyst necessary for successful voluntary disarmament.[27]

6.1 Dodoth-Turkana Cross-Border Conflict Mitigation Initiative

USAID, through its contracted agent (Development Alternatives, Inc.) and local partners (Riam Riam in Kenya and Kotido Peace Initiative (KOPEIN) in Uganda) funded a project in response to skirmishes involving Dodoth (Uganda) and Turkana (Kenya) that had taken place in March 2004. There had been expectations on the ground that a reprisal attack was set to take place in early 2005. That such an attack did not occur was attributed to the cross-border peace process implemented by Development Alternatives, Inc., and its partners.

Outputs of the project include:

- The Provisional Peace Agreement between Dodoth and Turkana tribal leaderships in December 2005. This is an all-inclusive accord that most importantly involved the participation of youth.
- Peaceful sharing of resources on both sides of the border.
- Negotiated return by the Dodoth of an abducted 14-year old Turkana boy to his family.
- A cross-border conflict prevention, mitigation, and response network of local organizations with mechanisms for sharing natural resources between communities.
- Cultural transformation from "readiness to raid and revenge" to "report [to local authorities] and wait for action."
- Partnership with government strengthened. Both the Kenyan and Ugandan governments have begun working more closely with civil society in resolving cross-border disputes.
- Sustainable culture of peace and sharing in the region.

25 Interviews in Kenya and Sudan in May/June 2007.

26 The status and decision-making power of elders have been stripped by business elites and wealthy warriors that benefit from large-scale theft and excessively violent forms of cattle raiding.

27 In discussions with government officials in Eastern Equatoria and northern Kenya, many called for an increase in properly trained security personnel. Until that is accomplished, civilians will not have an incentive to give up their arms, which in many cases serve as people's only form of defense.

Within the framework of the USAID-funded conflict prevention, mitigation, and response strategy, the Peace in East and Central Africa (PEACE) program run by Development Alternatives, Inc., currently lends support to a host of local NGOs, CSOs, and CBOs that operate at the district level on either side of the border. Currently, there are a total of five cross-border conflict mitigation initiatives, like the Dodoth-Turkana project, currently under way in Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, and Uganda (USAID 2006).

As a result of the project, the two local partner CSOs, Riam Riam and KOPEIN, have built their capacity and continue conflict mitigation and peacebuilding in the border region. Riam Riam was brought into the disarmament process by the Kenyan government, and has acted as an intermediary between communities, government, and military leaders. Their objective is to represent the interests and security needs of pastoralists in order to avoid a replay of the events experienced in Turkana South. Similarly, KOPEIN conducts public awareness campaigns and sensitization workshops and works in close collaboration with the Ugandan police, UPDF, Ugandan Human Rights Commission, local government and community leaders, and NGOs (Oxfam and SNV) to promote dialogue and reconciliation between tribes in Karamoja, Uganda, and neighboring tribes in Kenya and Sudan.

This multi-layered initiative has inspired a culture of trust and respect for local conflict response mechanisms. Furthermore, through improved communication, pastoralists can resolve differences with rival tribes, and are also less likely to carry out raids knowing that there are systematic mechanisms for responding to such hostilities.

Likewise, the Adakar Peace and Development Initiatives (APEDI) were created to promote peace and security in the Turkana and Toposa regions of Kenya and Southern Sudan. When Operation Lifeline Sudan, which provided humanitarian assistance to Southern Sudan during the North-South conflict, was terminated, the International Committee of the Red Cross, whose base was located in Lokichoggio, donated its fixed assets to local CSOs and government and selected APEDI as the chief recipient. APEDI conducts its peace-building by addressing people's grievances at the local level and by targeting the kraals (adakar in the Turkana language) for dialogue and strategies of conflict resolution. Utilizing a combination of traditional and modern structures of authority, APEDI brokers peace settlements between clashing tribes before initial raids and attacks escalate into protracted armed violence. Typically, APEDI, with the backing of local government, elders, and chiefs, responds to raids by contacting the local government and CSOs in Narus, just over the border in Sudan.[28] The leaders from both communities negotiate for the safe return of cattle and compensation for lives lost.

28 The Toposa Development Association (TDA) and the Kapoeta East Native Development Association (KENDA) are conducting similar conflict mitigation programs in Eastern Equatoria, Sudan.

APEDI in Action: Negotiating Peace

Following an attack that claimed the lives of two prominent Turkana warriors and resulted in the theft of their rifles and 215 goats and sheep, APEDI mobilized its first intervention in February 2005. Joined by Turkana chiefs, elders, and a peace committee comprised of local leaders, APEDI paid a visit to Toposa chiefs and elders in Sudan. During this meeting, they negotiated the safe return of the two rifles and livestock and designed the framework for a sensitization campaign for peace that would employ traditional lines of authority in their respective communities. This intervention brought about an eighteen-month cease-fire that, for the first time in years, allowed Turkana and Toposa to safely walk with their livestock across the border. However, the cease-fire came to an abrupt end in January 2007 following an attack by Toposa raiders almost 50 kilometers outside Lokichoggio. APEDI nevertheless responded with cross-border negotiations and continues to play an instrumental role in the settlement of small-scale subsequent reprisals by both sides.[29]

Contrary to disarmament initiatives in the region that apply top-down blanket solutions to complex sets of circumstances, local initiatives that embrace both customary and current practices of governance are producing results. The emergence of CSO response mechanisms provides a potential deterrence effect for identifying communities whose members have engaged in raiding. Although these local organizations have brought rewards to the region, in most cases they lack the capacity and budget to produce results large enough to grab the attention of the international and donor community.

7. Regional Initiatives

In response to the vast failings of coercive disarmament, multilateral and bilateral agencies are exploring alternative approaches to mitigating pastoral conflicts. Regional bodies, host governments and donors are becoming increasingly more aware of the spillover effects of the pastoralist conflict. Consequently, peacebuilding initiatives are gaining more attention and resources from governments than in the past.

Due to the cross-border challenges presented by warring groups, certain countries in the Horn of Africa formed the Nairobi Secretariat, which later became the Regional Center on Small Arms and Light Weapons (RECSA).[30] RECSA was expected to enhance the capacity of states to meet the commitments enshrined in the Nairobi Protocol.[31] RECSA also acts as a forum for cooperation among National Focal Points and other relevant agencies to prevent, combat, and eradicate stockpiling and illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa.

In a parallel initiative, the Eastern Africa Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization (EAPCCO) works closely with government and CSOs to develop, strengthen and enforce legislation aimed at reducing cattle rustling and associated armed violence. In 2005, EAPCCO introduced the Protocol on the Prevention, Combating, and Eradication of Cattle Rustling in Eastern Africa.[32] Eleven East African countries signed the protocol in August 2008 (EAPCCO 2008).[33]

Finally, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) established the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) in 2002 in order to enhance awareness of pastoral conflicts in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda. With field monitors reporting from each of the

29 Phone interview with Alex Losikiria, Coordinator of APEDI, July 3, 2007.

30 RECSA has twelve members, namely Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda.

31 The Nairobi Protocol (2004) sets minimum standards to govern the manufacture, possession, marking, import, export, transit, transfer, and stockpiling of small arms and light weapons. It also outlines provisions regarding disarmament, security providers, and awareness-raising.

32 The objectives of the Protocol are to: "1) Prevent, combat and eradicate cattle rustling and related criminal activities in the Eastern Africa region; 2) Systematically and comprehensively address cattle rustling in the region in order to ensure that its negative social and economic consequences are eradicated and that peoples' livelihoods are secured; 3) Enhance regional co-operation, joint operations, capacity-building and exchange of information and; 4) Promote peace, human security and development in the region."

33 Signatories include Republic of Burundi, Republic of Djibouti, State of Eritrea, Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Republic of Kenya, Republic of Rwanda, Republic of Seychelles, Republic of Somalia, Republic of Sudan, United Republic of Tanzania, and Republic of Uganda.

countries, CEWARN is able to track and report on violent incidents in order to equip governments with knowledge regarding trends on and factors behind pastoral violence. The recent growth in regional initiatives lends credence to the idea that the pastoralist conflict has become an issue worth addressing. Governments, in cooperation with CSOs, have brought greater attention to the issue and created a regional legislative framework. Nevertheless, despite these encouraging developments, states still have a predisposition to disarm communities, often coercively. This has not only resulted in outbreaks of violence but, in many cases, increased demand for weapons.

8. Recommendations

8.1. Improved Security and Peacebuilding

- Governments need to install adequate law enforcement in the pastoralist regions. They need to offer sizeable incentives so that security forces will not resort to corruption as a way of supplementing their income. Security posts should be positioned on borders and at violence hotspots where tribes are known to clash.
- Governments and international organizations should support and build the capacity of local CSOs that are working locally to mitigate conflict and sensitize communities with workshops and peacebuilding campaigns. This includes, but is not limited to, supplying vehicles and CB radios so that CSOs can effectively contact authorities for early response.
- A regional body of CSOs should be formed to enable local organizations to share knowledge, form partnerships, and work cooperatively toward peace.
- Build feeder roads connecting main roads to small villages so that authorities can quickly reach affected areas. Knowing that security providers have access to villages and kraals would act as a deterrent to raiding warriors. Improved road transport would also enable pastoralists to partake in local commerce.

8.2. Sustainable Development

- Governments and donors must continue to build water wells so that villages can sustain their livestock during the dry season. This would also reduce the amount of time women and girls spend fetching water from pumps that are sometimes hours away by foot.
- Establish cooperatives and inter-tribal commerce of local goods and livestock in order to build partnerships and economic development through trade. This would, in the long-term, undermine the illicit commercial practices of livestock traders in the area.
- Plant Napier grass in grazing areas. Napier grass grows very quickly and is tolerant of drought conditions.

8.3 Disarmament

- Once proper security provisions have been established, traditional disarmament practices should be reformed. Coordinated voluntary disarmament programs should be implemented that disarm neighboring tribes simultaneously.
- For those surrendering weapons, some kind of compensation should be offered. In order to avoid solely rewarding those with weapons, "weapons for development" programs should be implemented. Whole villages are rewarded with improved infrastructure and social services after a certain number of weapons have been collected.
- Communities must be sensitized to and informed about disarmament exercises before they commence. Furthermore, community members should play an active role in the disarmament process to give them ownership over the security of their communities.
- Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration campaigns must be introduced for paramilitary groups in Sudan and Uganda. Particular attention should be given to the reintegration phase that trains ex-combatants for employment, so that they do not return to a life of violence.
- The Kenya/Uganda Joint Security Program that was established in 2005, but has yet to be implemented, should begin operations as outlined in its program of action:
  - Simultaneous and coordinated disarmament operations
  - Mobilization, sensitization, and deployment
  - Establishment of law and order in areas of operation
  - Branding of livestock
  - Provision and reconstruction of social and physical infrastructure
  - Rewards and recognition
  - Support the development of alternative livelihoods

9. Conclusion

The factors contributing to the pastoralist conflict are multidimensional, and have ramifications that affect livelihoods within and across borders. Governments have failed to invest sufficient human and financial capital in abating the conflict and the underlying underdevelopment in the pastoral regions. Responding to this conflict with uncoordinated top-down "disarmament for disarmament's sake" initiatives clearly mask the root causes, and in a number of cases destabilizes communities. Given the poor disarmament record of governments and the fact that they lack the capacity to conduct simultaneous cross-border disarmament programs, disarmament does not appear to be a palatable option until there has been a full overhaul of the security sector supported by policies to address the demand for small arms.

The efforts of local conflict mitigation organizations have proved to be an effective alternative to the recent destabilizing disarmament initiatives. As a result, a culture of pastoralism is emerging that relies more heavily on local instruments of conflict response, and their respective consequences, as opposed to confidence-eroding disarmament programs that prematurely disarm insecure communities. When communities no longer face threats from neighboring tribes and inadequate security providers, weapons will lose their utility and worth and voluntary disarmament will be an appropriate answer to the small arms dilemma in this pastoralist region.

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Abbreviations

APEDI	Adakar Peace and Development Initiatives
CBO	Community-based Organization
CEWARN	Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism
CSO	Civil Society Organization
EAPCCO	East African Police Chiefs Co-operation Organization
GoSS	Government of Southern Sudan
KENDA	Kapoeta East Native Development Association
KOPEIN	Kotido Peace Initiative
KPR	Kenyan Police Reservists
PEACE	Peace in East and Central Africa
RECSA	Regional Center on Small Arms and Light Weapons
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
UPDF	Uganda People's Defense Force
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

Jonah Leff
jonah.leff@gmail.com